Recent Developments in Game Theory

Edited by Eric S. Maskin, Harvard University, US and winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics 2007

• Contents:Acknowledgements • Introduction Part I: Evolution1. Michihiro Kandori, George J. Mailath and Rafael Rob (1993), ‘Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games’2. H. Peyton Young (1993), ‘The Evolution of Conventions’3. Glenn Ellison (1993), ‘Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination’4. Daniel Friedman (1991), ‘Evolutionary Games in Economics’Part II: Implementation Theory5. Dilip Abreau and Hitoshi Matsushima (1992), ‘Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information’6. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), ‘Subgame Perfect Implementation’7. Matthew O. Jackson (1991), ‘Bayesian Implementation’Part III: Learning8. Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer (1993), ‘Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium’9. Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps (1993), ‘Learning Mixed Equilibria’10. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1991), ‘Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games’Part IV: Rationalizability11. B. Douglas Bernheim (1984), ‘Rationalizable Strategic Behavior’12. Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel (1987), ‘Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria’13. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990), ‘Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities’Part V: Repeated Games14. Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin (1990), ‘Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games’15. Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Eric Maskin (1994), ‘The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information’16. Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin (1989), ‘Renegotiation in Repeated Games’Part VI: Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory17. Faruk Gul (1989), ‘Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value’18. Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell (1996), ‘Bargaining and Value’19. Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny (1994), ‘A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core’Name Index