C. A. Hooker is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Newcastle, Australia. He is the author of A Realistic Theory of Science and, with Kai Halweg, Issues in Evolutionary Epistemology, also published by SUNY Press.

• Acknowledgments 1 Setting the Scene: Naturalism and the Prospects for Evolutionary Epistemology and Reason Introduction1.I. Evolutionary Naturalist Realism: A Philosophical Outline1.II. Evolutionary Epistemology in a Naturalist Setting2 Towards a Regulatory Systems Conception of Science Introduction: Five Regulatory Systems Ideas and Their Use2.I. A Framework for Theorizing Complex Regulatory Systems2.I.1. The Distinction between Functional(\Informational) and Causal Systems Descriptions (Idea 1)2.I.2. The Distinction between Populations and Individuals: Not Collections to Members but Regulatory Systems to Subsystems (Idea 2)2.I.3. A Framework of Two Dichotomies2.II. Cognitive Systems Dynamics for Science2.II.1. Regulation, Invariance, and Objectivity(Idea 3)2.II.2. Adaptation/Adaptability, Refinement/Ascent and Progress (Idea 4)2.III. Science as an Intrinsically Social Regulatory System (Idea 5)2.III.1. Regulation, Information, and Institutional Design3 Reason and the Regulation of Decisions: Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology (with Bary Hodges) Introduction and Overview3.I. Logical Empiricism and Popperian Method: Formalism and the Control of Decisions3.I.1. Logical Empiricism3.I.2. Popperian Method and Logical Empiricism3.I.3. Critique of Popperian Method3.I.4. Control of Decisions: The Popperian Methodological Dilemma3.II. Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology: Analysis and Critique3.II.1. The Natural Selection of Theories3.II.1.1. Evolutionary Continuity3.II.1.2. Differences in Error Elimination3.II.1.3. Error Elimination in World 3 and Plastic Controls3.II.1.4. Unity or Schizophrenia? Popper's Problem of Evolutionary Method3.II.2. Selection of Theories in a Symbolic Environment3.II.2.1. Analogies, Disanalogies, and Popper's Problem3.II.2.2. Ackermann on Selection in World 33.II.2.3. The Contents of World 33.II.2.4. Selecting Theories: the Design of Method3.II.2.5. Conclusion3.III. Toward a Regulatory Systems-Based Reassessment of the Significance of Popper's Philosophy3.III.1. Problems and Lessons from PEE3.III.2. The Control of Decisions3.III.3. Plastic Controls and Social Rationality3.III.4. Conclusion4 Regulatory Systems and Pragmatism: A Critical Study of Rescher's Evolutionary Epistemology Introduction and Summary4.I. Thesis Pragmatism and Its Critique4.II. Methodological Pragmatism4.III. Presumptions, Regulative Principles, Constitutive Theses, and Justification4.IV. Reprise and Prospect4.V. Methodological Dynamics4.VI. Rationality4.VII. Regulation4.VIII. Rescher on Evolutionary Epistemology and Method Darwinism4.IX. Scientific Progress4.X. Conclusion5 Regulatory Constructivism: Jean Piaget Introduction5.I. Piaget's Regulatory Systems Framework5.I.1. Piaget's Developmental Psychology and Biology5.I.2. The Structure and Scope of Genetic Epistemology5.I.2.1. Genetic Epistemology as Process5.I.2.2. Piaget and Products of Processes5.I.2.3. Processes and Universal Form5.I.2.4. Non-naturalist Interpretations of Piaget5.I.3. Genetic Epistemology and Evolutionary Epistemology5.II. Piaget's Normative Epistemology5.II.1. Introduction5.II.2. The Status of Philosophical Construction5.II.3. Piaget's Conception of Reason5.II.4. The Normative Nature of Genetic Epistemology5.II.5. Piaget: Rationalist or Naturalist?5.II.6. Conclusion6 Naturalized Reason Introduction6.I. Naturalizing Reason6.I.1. How Not to Naturalize6.I.2. A Perspective on Reason6.I.2.1 The Western Rational Project6.I.2.2 Beyond Formal Reason6.I.3. Naturalization6.I.3.1 Theorizing truth6.I.3.2 Theorizing Epistemology Naturalistically6.I.4. Putnam against Naturalized Reason6.I.5. What Is It to Naturalize Reason?6.II. The Nature of Reason6.II.1. Reason, the Regulation of Judgment6.II.2. Reason and Regulatory Ideals6.II.3. Contexts of Rational Action6.II.4. Reason and Efficiency6.II.5. Naturalist Reason and Creativity6.I1.6. Biology and Reason6.II.7. The Historical Manifestation of Reason6.II.8. ConclusionNotes Bibliography Name Index Subject Index

"The strongest point of this book is that it ties together a number of trends in modern science under the perspective of naturalistic systems, seeing human reason as a part of the system of nature itself. The approach is consistently rigorous, making it difficult to dismiss." — John Collier

C. A. Hooker is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Newcastle, Australia. He is the author of A Realistic Theory of Science and, with Kai Halweg, Issues in Evolutionary Epistemology, also published by SUNY Press.

• Acknowledgments 1 Setting the Scene: Naturalism and the Prospects for Evolutionary Epistemology and Reason Introduction1.I. Evolutionary Naturalist Realism: A Philosophical Outline1.II. Evolutionary Epistemology in a Naturalist Setting2 Towards a Regulatory Systems Conception of Science Introduction: Five Regulatory Systems Ideas and Their Use2.I. A Framework for Theorizing Complex Regulatory Systems2.I.1. The Distinction between Functional(\Informational) and Causal Systems Descriptions (Idea 1)2.I.2. The Distinction between Populations and Individuals: Not Collections to Members but Regulatory Systems to Subsystems (Idea 2)2.I.3. A Framework of Two Dichotomies2.II. Cognitive Systems Dynamics for Science2.II.1. Regulation, Invariance, and Objectivity(Idea 3)2.II.2. Adaptation/Adaptability, Refinement/Ascent and Progress (Idea 4)2.III. Science as an Intrinsically Social Regulatory System (Idea 5)2.III.1. Regulation, Information, and Institutional Design3 Reason and the Regulation of Decisions: Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology (with Bary Hodges) Introduction and Overview3.I. Logical Empiricism and Popperian Method: Formalism and the Control of Decisions3.I.1. Logical Empiricism3.I.2. Popperian Method and Logical Empiricism3.I.3. Critique of Popperian Method3.I.4. Control of Decisions: The Popperian Methodological Dilemma3.II. Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology: Analysis and Critique3.II.1. The Natural Selection of Theories3.II.1.1. Evolutionary Continuity3.II.1.2. Differences in Error Elimination3.II.1.3. Error Elimination in World 3 and Plastic Controls3.II.1.4. Unity or Schizophrenia? Popper's Problem of Evolutionary Method3.II.2. Selection of Theories in a Symbolic Environment3.II.2.1. Analogies, Disanalogies, and Popper's Problem3.II.2.2. Ackermann on Selection in World 33.II.2.3. The Contents of World 33.II.2.4. Selecting Theories: the Design of Method3.II.2.5. Conclusion3.III. Toward a Regulatory Systems-Based Reassessment of the Significance of Popper's Philosophy3.III.1. Problems and Lessons from PEE3.III.2. The Control of Decisions3.III.3. Plastic Controls and Social Rationality3.III.4. Conclusion4 Regulatory Systems and Pragmatism: A Critical Study of Rescher's Evolutionary Epistemology Introduction and Summary4.I. Thesis Pragmatism and Its Critique4.II. Methodological Pragmatism4.III. Presumptions, Regulative Principles, Constitutive Theses, and Justification4.IV. Reprise and Prospect4.V. Methodological Dynamics4.VI. Rationality4.VII. Regulation4.VIII. Rescher on Evolutionary Epistemology and Method Darwinism4.IX. Scientific Progress4.X. Conclusion5 Regulatory Constructivism: Jean Piaget Introduction5.I. Piaget's Regulatory Systems Framework5.I.1. Piaget's Developmental Psychology and Biology5.I.2. The Structure and Scope of Genetic Epistemology5.I.2.1. Genetic Epistemology as Process5.I.2.2. Piaget and Products of Processes5.I.2.3. Processes and Universal Form5.I.2.4. Non-naturalist Interpretations of Piaget5.I.3. Genetic Epistemology and Evolutionary Epistemology5.II. Piaget's Normative Epistemology5.II.1. Introduction5.II.2. The Status of Philosophical Construction5.II.3. Piaget's Conception of Reason5.II.4. The Normative Nature of Genetic Epistemology5.II.5. Piaget: Rationalist or Naturalist?5.II.6. Conclusion6 Naturalized Reason Introduction6.I. Naturalizing Reason6.I.1. How Not to Naturalize6.I.2. A Perspective on Reason6.I.2.1 The Western Rational Project6.I.2.2 Beyond Formal Reason6.I.3. Naturalization6.I.3.1 Theorizing truth6.I.3.2 Theorizing Epistemology Naturalistically6.I.4. Putnam against Naturalized Reason6.I.5. What Is It to Naturalize Reason?6.II. The Nature of Reason6.II.1. Reason, the Regulation of Judgment6.II.2. Reason and Regulatory Ideals6.II.3. Contexts of Rational Action6.II.4. Reason and Efficiency6.II.5. Naturalist Reason and Creativity6.I1.6. Biology and Reason6.II.7. The Historical Manifestation of Reason6.II.8. ConclusionNotes Bibliography Name Index Subject Index

"The strongest point of this book is that it ties together a number of trends in modern science under the perspective of naturalistic systems, seeing human reason as a part of the system of nature itself. The approach is consistently rigorous, making it difficult to dismiss." — John Collier

C. A. Hooker is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Newcastle, Australia. He is the author of A Realistic Theory of Science and, with Kai Halweg, Issues in Evolutionary Epistemology, also published by SUNY Press.

• Acknowledgments 1 Setting the Scene: Naturalism and the Prospects for Evolutionary Epistemology and Reason Introduction1.I. Evolutionary Naturalist Realism: A Philosophical Outline1.II. Evolutionary Epistemology in a Naturalist Setting2 Towards a Regulatory Systems Conception of Science Introduction: Five Regulatory Systems Ideas and Their Use2.I. A Framework for Theorizing Complex Regulatory Systems2.I.1. The Distinction between Functional(\Informational) and Causal Systems Descriptions (Idea 1)2.I.2. The Distinction between Populations and Individuals: Not Collections to Members but Regulatory Systems to Subsystems (Idea 2)2.I.3. A Framework of Two Dichotomies2.II. Cognitive Systems Dynamics for Science2.II.1. Regulation, Invariance, and Objectivity(Idea 3)2.II.2. Adaptation/Adaptability, Refinement/Ascent and Progress (Idea 4)2.III. Science as an Intrinsically Social Regulatory System (Idea 5)2.III.1. Regulation, Information, and Institutional Design3 Reason and the Regulation of Decisions: Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology (with Bary Hodges) Introduction and Overview3.I. Logical Empiricism and Popperian Method: Formalism and the Control of Decisions3.I.1. Logical Empiricism3.I.2. Popperian Method and Logical Empiricism3.I.3. Critique of Popperian Method3.I.4. Control of Decisions: The Popperian Methodological Dilemma3.II. Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology: Analysis and Critique3.II.1. The Natural Selection of Theories3.II.1.1. Evolutionary Continuity3.II.1.2. Differences in Error Elimination3.II.1.3. Error Elimination in World 3 and Plastic Controls3.II.1.4. Unity or Schizophrenia? Popper's Problem of Evolutionary Method3.II.2. Selection of Theories in a Symbolic Environment3.II.2.1. Analogies, Disanalogies, and Popper's Problem3.II.2.2. Ackermann on Selection in World 33.II.2.3. The Contents of World 33.II.2.4. Selecting Theories: the Design of Method3.II.2.5. Conclusion3.III. Toward a Regulatory Systems-Based Reassessment of the Significance of Popper's Philosophy3.III.1. Problems and Lessons from PEE3.III.2. The Control of Decisions3.III.3. Plastic Controls and Social Rationality3.III.4. Conclusion4 Regulatory Systems and Pragmatism: A Critical Study of Rescher's Evolutionary Epistemology Introduction and Summary4.I. Thesis Pragmatism and Its Critique4.II. Methodological Pragmatism4.III. Presumptions, Regulative Principles, Constitutive Theses, and Justification4.IV. Reprise and Prospect4.V. Methodological Dynamics4.VI. Rationality4.VII. Regulation4.VIII. Rescher on Evolutionary Epistemology and Method Darwinism4.IX. Scientific Progress4.X. Conclusion5 Regulatory Constructivism: Jean Piaget Introduction5.I. Piaget's Regulatory Systems Framework5.I.1. Piaget's Developmental Psychology and Biology5.I.2. The Structure and Scope of Genetic Epistemology5.I.2.1. Genetic Epistemology as Process5.I.2.2. Piaget and Products of Processes5.I.2.3. Processes and Universal Form5.I.2.4. Non-naturalist Interpretations of Piaget5.I.3. Genetic Epistemology and Evolutionary Epistemology5.II. Piaget's Normative Epistemology5.II.1. Introduction5.II.2. The Status of Philosophical Construction5.II.3. Piaget's Conception of Reason5.II.4. The Normative Nature of Genetic Epistemology5.II.5. Piaget: Rationalist or Naturalist?5.II.6. Conclusion6 Naturalized Reason Introduction6.I. Naturalizing Reason6.I.1. How Not to Naturalize6.I.2. A Perspective on Reason6.I.2.1 The Western Rational Project6.I.2.2 Beyond Formal Reason6.I.3. Naturalization6.I.3.1 Theorizing truth6.I.3.2 Theorizing Epistemology Naturalistically6.I.4. Putnam against Naturalized Reason6.I.5. What Is It to Naturalize Reason?6.II. The Nature of Reason6.II.1. Reason, the Regulation of Judgment6.II.2. Reason and Regulatory Ideals6.II.3. Contexts of Rational Action6.II.4. Reason and Efficiency6.II.5. Naturalist Reason and Creativity6.I1.6. Biology and Reason6.II.7. The Historical Manifestation of Reason6.II.8. ConclusionNotes Bibliography Name Index Subject Index

"The strongest point of this book is that it ties together a number of trends in modern science under the perspective of naturalistic systems, seeing human reason as a part of the system of nature itself. The approach is consistently rigorous, making it difficult to dismiss." — John Collier