Psychiatric Casualties

Mark C. Russell is core faculty in the PsyD Program at Antioch University Seattle, where he is establishing director of the Institute of War Stress Injury, Recovery, and Social Justice. He is a former U.S. Navy commander and military clinical psychologist with over twenty-six years of military service.Charles Figley is the Paul Henry Kurzweg, MD Distinguished Chair in Disaster Mental Health; professor of social work; and director of the Traumatology Institute at Tulane University. He is the author of many books, the first of which, Stress Disorders Among Vietnam Veterans (1978), contributed to the diagnosis of PTSD. He served a tour of duty in the Vietnam War as a member of the U.S. Marine Corps.

• PrefaceAcknowledgmentsIntroduction: The Genesis of the Military’s Mental Health Dilemma1. A War to Die For: Casualty Trends of Modern Warfare2. The Dark Side of Military Mental Health: A History of Self-Inflicted Wounds3. Cruel and Inhumane Handling: The First Dark-Side Strategy4. Legal Prosecution, Incarceration, and Executions of Mental Illness: The Second Dark-Side Strategy5. Humiliate, Ridicule, and Shame into Submission: The Third Dark-Side Strategy6. Denying the Psychiatric Reality of War: The Fourth Dark-Side Strategy7. Purging Weakness: The Fifth Dark-Side Strategy8. Delay, Deceive, and Delay Again: The Sixth Dark-Side Strategy9. Faulty Diagnosis and Backdoor Discharges: The Seventh Dark-Side Strategy10. Avoiding Responsibility and Accountability: The Eighth Dark-Side Strategy11. Inadequate, Experimental, or Harmful Treatment: The Ninth Dark-Side Strategy12. Perpetuating Neglect, Indifference, and Self-Inflicted Crises: The Tenth Dark-Side Strategy13. Toward a Resilient and Mentally Healthy Military14. Transforming Military Mental Healthcare: Three Options for ChangeAppendixNotesReferencesIndex

Mark C. Russell and Charles Figley provide a thorough and thoughtful analysis of how the U.S. military has historically failed to adequately manage the mental health problems that inevitably occur during and in the aftermath of military action, and they suggest potential solutions to prevent repeating such failures in the future.