Prevalence of General Rules in Hume’s Philosophy

This volume examines one of the most significant yet understudied aspects of David Hume's philosophy: his theory of general rules. Despite Hume's own emphasis on their importance, general rules have rarely received the sustained scholarly attention they deserve.Bringing together contributions from leading Hume scholars including Donald Ainslie, Lorne Falkenstein, Peter Fosl, Jennifer Marušić, Peter Millican, and Jacqueline Taylor, this volume explores how general rules function across Hume's philosophical system. The contributors explore how general rules shape causal inference and belief formation; their influence on passions, sympathy, and moral judgments; their role in prejudice formation and critical thinking; and how they function in basic cognition and concept formation. The volume reveals Hume's sophisticated understanding of cognitive processes, including what modern philosophers might recognize as dual-process theories and implicit bias. By examining how general rules operate throughout Hume's work, it provides fresh insights into his theories of reason, passion, morality, and human nature.The Prevalence of General Rules in Hume’s Philosophy is an excellent resource for Hume scholars, historians of philosophy, and those interested in epistemology, moral psychology, and the history of psychology.