Practical Expressivism

Neil Sinclair studied Philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, culminating in a PhD from Cambridge in 2006. Subsequently he has taught philosophy at several UK Universities, including Bristol, Oxford, St. Andrews, and Nottingham. He was awarded a University of Nottingham Lord Dearing Award for Teaching in Learning in 2014 and the Marc Sanders Metaethics Prize in 2016. He has published more than 25 papers on metaethics including for journals such as Analysis, Biology and Philosophy, and Philosophical Studies. He is the editor of The Naturalistic Fallacy (Cambridge University Press 2018) and Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics (with Uri D. Leibowitz, Oxford University Press 2016) and an area editor for Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.

• Preface 1: The Subject Matter of Metaethics 2: Practical Expressivism, Morality's Function, and Moral Attitudes 3: Practical Expressivism, Expression, and Quasi-Realism 4: Moral Disagreement and Reason-Giving 5: The Frege-Geach Problem 6: Subsentential Metasemantics 7: Truth, Truth-aptness, and Belief 8: Mind-Independent Moral Truths and Categorical Moral Reasons 9: Practical Expressivist Strategies and Presumptive Arguments for Realism 10: Conclusion Appendix A: Comparison with Other Versions of Expressivism Bibliography

The accommodation project that Sinclair articulates seems mightily laudable, and his attempt to execute significant chunks of it contains a lot that is helpful and of interest with regard to the prospects of expressivist views in metaethics.