Poor States, Power and the Politics of IMF Reform

Mark Hibben is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Saint Joseph’s College of Maine, USA.

• 1. The IMF, LIDC Reform and the post Washington Consensus1.1. What drives post Washington Consensus IMF LIDC reform and why does it matter1.2. Contested areas of IMF LIDC policy in the post 2008 era1.3Who are the LIDCs  1.4Organization, research design, and findings 2. The IMF and LIDCs2.1Mandate, quota system, and organizational structure2.2Organizational structure2.3Lending facilities, FSAPs and the PSI 2.4Operational culture 2.51944-1952: The Bretton Woods framework and the rise of IMF conditionality 2.61953-1961:  IMF ‘common sense’, the Polak Model, and SBAs2.71962- 1971: Push back, early concessionary lending, and LIDC technical assistance  2.81971-1996: Breakdown of Bretton Woods and the Washington Consensus2.9Conclusion3. Theorizing post Washington Consensus LIDC Reform3.1What influences IMF policy?3.2Theorizing IMF LIDC reform: A rationalist approach3.3Theorizing IMF LIDC reform: A constructivist approach3.4Theorizing IMF LIDC reform: A historical structural approach3.5Conclusion4. The HIPC and HIPC II Initiatives4.1Setting the stage for HIPC and HIPC II: The breakdown of Bretton Woods hegemony4.2The Mexican Debt crisis, demand compression, and structural market reform4.3From bilateral debt restructuring to debt reduction4.4Rethinking IMF LIDC debt forgiveness: the HIPC initiative4.5‘Faster, deeper, and broader debt relief’ with poverty reduction: the HIPC II4.6Conclusion5. ‘Pro-Poor’ Concessionary Lending: The PRGF5.