Political Economy of Regulation

Edited by Thomas P. Lyon, Dow Chemical Professor of Sustainable Science, Technology and Commerce, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, School of Natural Resources and Environment and Director, Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, US

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Thomas P. LyonPART ITARGETS OF REGULATION 1. Harold Demsetz (1968), ‘Why Regulate Utilities?’2. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), ‘Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies – in General and with Respect to CATV’3. R.H. Coase (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’4. Martin L. Weitzman (1974), ‘Prices vs. Quantities’5. Hayne E. Leland (1979), ‘Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards’PART IICAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATION 6. Gordon Tullock (1967), ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’7. Sam Peltzman (1976), ‘Toward a More General Theory of Regulation’8. Gary S. Becker (1983), ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’9. Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan (1984), ‘Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics’10. Gregg A. Jarrell (1978), ‘The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry’11. George L. Priest (1993), ‘The Origins of Utility Regulation and the “Theories of Regulation” Debate’12. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1975), ‘Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes’13. Michael T. Maloney and Robert E. McCormick (1982), ‘A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation’14. B. Peter Pashigian (1985), ‘Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being Protected?’15. Sam Peltzman (1975), ‘The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation’PART IIIPOLITICAL CONTROL, ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND ENFORCEMENT16. Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran (1983), ‘Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission’17. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast (1989), ‘Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies’18. Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller (1994), ‘The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation’19. Daniel McFadden (1976), ‘The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evidence’20. Thomas P. Lyon and John W. Mayo (2005) ‘Regulatory Opportunism and Investment Behavior: Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry’21. P. Fenn and C.G. Veljanovski (1988), ‘A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement’22. David Weil (1996), ‘If OSHA is So Bad, Why is Compliance So Good?’PART IVSELF-REGULATION 23. Sheoli Pargal and David Wheeler (1996), ‘Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia’24. John W. Maxwell, Thomas P. Lyon and Steven C. Hackett (2000), ‘Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism’Name Index

'An excellent collection of classic and modern analyses of key regulatory issues. A valuable reference for students, teachers, and practitioners of regulatory policy.'