Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting

Häftad, Engelska, 2014

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This book presents the latest research in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. Many of them have been influenced by Nobel laureate Douglass North, who pioneered the new institutional social sciences, or by William H.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2014-10-07
Mått155 x 235 x 24 mm
Vikt657 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor425
Upplaga2011
FörlagSpringer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
ISBN9783642435133

Tillhör följande kategorier

Introduction.- Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?.- War, Wealth, and the Formation of States.- Why Do Weak States Prefer Prohibition to Taxation?.- Self-enforcing, Public-order Institutions for Contract Enforcement: Litigation, Regulation, and Limited Government in Venice, 1050 - 1350.- Judicial Stability During Regime Change: Apex Courts in India 1937-1960.- Institutional Arrangements Matter for Both Efficiency and Distribution: Contributions and Challenges of the New Institutional Economics.- Institutional Foundations, Committee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Institutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain).- Coalition Governments and Electoral Behavior: Who Is Accountable?.- Democracy and Voting: Empirical and Formal Models of the United States Presidential Elections in 2000 and 2004.- Modelling Elections in Post-Communist Regimes: Voter Perceptions, Political Leaders and Activists.- Electoral Systems and Party Responsiveness.- Electoral Institutions and Political Corruption: Ballot Structure, Electoral Formula, and Graft.- A Model of Party Entry in Parliamentary Systems with Proportional Representation.- Moving in Time: Legislative Party Switching as Time-Contingent Choice.- On the Distribution of Particularistic Goods.- Vote Revelation: Empirical Content of Scoring Rules.