Political Economy of Democratic Institutions

Inbunden, Engelska, 2000

2 389 kr

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Majority rules are generally unstable and not binding for future voters, and so are insufficient for the required security of a market economy. In this challenging book, Peter Moser argues that stability can be achieved by democratic political institutions limiting the influence of majorities.Peter Moser examines the contribution to stable policy choices of a wide range of political institutions including constitutional rules, the organizational structure of legislatures and administrative and judicial procedures. He contributes new insights about the importance of decision rules in democracies by combining theory with empirical studies. He analyses legislative procedures in the US, the European Union and Switzerland, tests a novel explanation for central bank independence, discusses the implications of political decision rules for regulatory behavior, and provides a concise survey of recent critical research on democratic institutions.This book will be particularly welcomed by public choice scholars as well as other economists and political scientists interested in the role of democratic institutions.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2000-05-25
Mått156 x 234 x undefined mm
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieThe Locke Institute series
FörlagEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd
ISBN9781858989662

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Contents: 1. Introduction Part I: Legislative Institutions and Public Policy: A Survey of the Literature 2. Collective Decisions under Simple Majority Rules 3. Institutional Constraints and Stability 4. Legislative Institutions and Policy Choices: Selected Applications Part II: Institutions and Stability: Checks and Balances in the Swiss Political System 5. A Model of Legislative Decisions 6. A Model of Constitutional Decisions 7. Uncertainty and Interest Groups Part III: Institutions and Policy Choice: The Conditional Influence of the European Parliament 8. Strategic Interactions in Legislative Procedures in the European Union 9. Case Study on Car Emission Standards Part IV: Institutions and Regulatory Behavior: Checks and Balances as a Prerequisite for Independent Central Banks 10. Legislative Choice of the Monetary Institution 11. Legislative Structure and Central Bank Independence Epilogue: Markets, Checks and Balances, and Commitments References Index

'. . . a rich introduction to the spatial voting literature and to comparative institutional analysis - as well as a cogent statement that, indeed, institutions matter. . . . The book is notable in its eclecticism and thoroughness; it will have the rare appeal to both political scientists and economists in both Europe and America. Moreover, the exposition is careful and the mechanics of spatial social choice analysis are made clear, so it is suitable for some applied classroom use.'