Plausible Argument in Everyday Conversation

Douglas N. Walton is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.

• Preface 1. Reasoning and Argument in Everyday Conversation 1. Presumptive Reasoning in Plausible Argument2. A Case Study: The Dialogue on Tipping3. Evaluation of the Dialogue4. The Internal Shift to Higher Abstraction5. Fallacies and Obstructive Tactics6. Fallacies of Burden of Proof7. Some Other Fallacies8. What Is an Argument? What Is Reasoning?9. The Use of Reasoning in Argument10. Rethinking Argument and Reasoning 2. Presumption 1. The Target Concept of Presumption2. Assumptions, Concessions, and Presuppositions3. Strengths of Presumptions4. Speech Act Conditions for Presumptions5. Kinds of Warrants for Making a Presumption6. General, Specific, Explicit, and Nonexplicit Presumptions7. Presumptive Inferences8. Presumptive Conditionals Clarified9. Traditional Accounts of Secundum Quid and Related Fallacies10. Analysis of the Secundum Quid Fallacy 3. Dialogue 1. The Nature of Dialogue2. Turn Taking in Dialogue3. Types of Dialogue4. Discussion and Inquiry5. Critical Discussion6. The Nature of Burden of Proof7. The Basis of Argument8. A Classification of Types of Dialogue9. Dialectical Shifts10. Mixed Dialogues 4. Eristic Dialogue 1. Plato and Aristotle on Eristic Dialgoue2. Eristic Dialogue: A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis3. Differences Between Debate and Quarrel4. Organized Group Quarrels5. Propaganda6. Valuable Functions of the Quarrel7. Shift to the Quarrel by Bias Ad Hominem Argument8. Gradual Shift to the Quarrel9. Frame of Mind for Argument10. Bias 5. Argument 1. What Is Argument Taken to Be?2. The Semantic Conception of Argument3. Inference and Argument4. The Speech Act Theory Approach5. Three Uses of Argument6. Dialogue as Meta-Argument7. Argument Defined Pluralistically8. The Functional Theory9. Properties of Arguments10. Aristotle on Reasoning and Argument 6. Reasoning 1. What Is Reasoning?2. Circular Reasoning3. Kinds of Reasoning4. Practical and Discursive Reasoning5. Practical Inference6. Complex Practical Reasoning7. Satisficing and Maximizing8. Uses of Reasoning in Contexts of Dialogue9. A Case Study10. Summary 7. Fallacy 1. Seeming Validity2. Sophisms and Wrong Inferences3. Fallacies and Blunders4. Invalid Inferences and Fallacies5. Argumentum Ad Hominem6. Evaluating Ad Hominem Argumentation7. Argumentum Ad Ignorantiam8. Argumentum Ad Verecundiam9. Aristotle's Concept of Sophistical Refutation10. The Functional Theory of Fallacy 8. Synthesis 1. Use of Presumptions in the Dialogue on Tipping2. The Nature of Presumptive Reasoning3. Secundum Quid as a Dialectical Fallacy4. Maieutic Closure of Dialogue5. The Task of Evaluating an Argument6. Need for a Functional Approach Notes Bibliography Index

"Walton has done an excellent job of placing argument in the context of dialogue and relating it to other concepts that are significant determinants of the adequacy of both the process by which conclusions involving disputed issues are reached and the conclusions themselves. He provides a truly comprehensive examination of what has come to be called 'practical argument.' The book is an intellectually rich exploration of the many facets of this important topic. The author carefully articulates his reservations concerning past treatments of practical argument and then demonstrates how the view he espouses overcomes many of the deficiencies noted." — Dennis S. Gouran, Pennsylvania State University