Julien Bugnon is currently Postdoctoral Researcher in the project “Essential Indexicality and Thoughts about Experience” (jointly funded by the French National Research Agency and the Swiss National Science Foundation). His research interests lie in philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and epistemology, with a focus on consciousness—particularly its relation to values, introspection, self-knowledge, and artificial intelligence.Martine Nida-Rümelin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Fribourg. Her published work focuses on phenomenal consciousness, the identity of conscious subjects across time and possible worlds, the phenomenology of self-awareness, and the capacity of conscious subjects to engage in active behaviour. An account of what it is to be an experiencing being that integrates these different topics is elaborated in her book Conscious Individuals (forthcoming).Donncahdh O’Conaill is an independent researcher whose works focuses on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. He has written articles including "Subjecthood Transparency" (Analysis), "Subjectivity and Non-Objectifying Awareness" (Review of Philosophy & Psychology), "Subjectivity and Mineness" (Erkenntnis), and "The Identity of Experiences and the Identity of the Subject" (Philosophical Studies).

• Introduction: Self-Experience and the Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects Part 1: Self-Awareness and Conscious Experience 1. Experience, Reflection, and Pre-Reflection 2. How to Attend to Yourself as a Subject 3. Hiding in Plain Sight? On the Elusiveness of the Self Part 2: The Metaphysical Nature of Conscious Subjects 4. The Illusion of the Enduring Self 5. Agentive Self-Awareness and the Nature of the Conscious Self 6. The Hard Problem of the Self: A Case for Substance Dualism? 7. In Defence of Phenomenal Sharing Part 3: What Self-Awareness Reveals About the Nature of Conscious Subjects 8. What is it for an Experience to Belong to a Subject? A Phenomenological Argument for the Simple View 9. What Self-Acquaintance Says About Us 10. Persistence of Persons: Limits of a First-Personal Criterion