Personnel Economics in Practice

Häftad, Engelska, 2017

779 kr

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Personnel Economics in Practice, 3rd Edition by Edward Lazear and Michael Gibbs gives readers a rigorous framework for understanding organizational design and the management of employees. Economics has proven to be a powerful approach in the changing study of organizations and human resources by adding rigor and structure and clarifying many important issues. Not only will readers learn and apply ideas from microeconomics, they will also learn principles that will be valuable in their future careers.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2017-04-11
Mått189 x 235 x 15 mm
Vikt680 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor416
Upplaga3
FörlagJohn Wiley & Sons Inc
ISBN9781119427360

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Mikroekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap
Ledarskapsböcker inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

ABOUT THE AUTHORSPREFACEACKNOWLEDGMENTS PART ONE SORTING AND INVESTING IN EMPLOYEESCHAPTER 1 SETTING HIRING STANDARDSAn Example: Hiring Risky WorkersNew Hires as OptionsAnalysis A Counterargument Setting Hiring Standards Balancing Benefits Against Costs Foreign Competition The Method of Production How Many Workers to Hire? Other Factors Making Decisions with Imperfect Information Make a Decision Independent of Analysis Estimate the Relevant Information Experiment Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 2 RECRUITMENT Introduction Screening Job Applicants Credentials Learning a Worker’s Productivity Is Screening Profitable? For Whom? Probation Signaling Who Pays, and Who Benefits? Examples Signaling More Formally: Separating and Pooling Equilibria Which Type of Firm is More Likely to use Signaling? Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 3 INVESTMENT IN SKILLS Introduction Matching Investments in Education Effects of Costs and Benefits Was Benjamin Franklin Correct? Investments in On the Job Training General vs. Firm-Specific Human Capital Who Should Pay for Training? Implications of On the Job Training Rent Sharing and Compensation Implicit Contracting Summary Study QuestionsReferences Further Reading Appendix (available online)CHAPTER 4 MANAGING TURNOVER Introduction Is Turnover Good or Bad? Importance of Sorting Technical Change Organizational Change Hierarchical Structure Specific Human Capital Retention Strategies Reducing Costs of Losing Key Employees Embracing Turnover Bidding for Employees Raiding Other Firms: Benefits and Pitfalls Offer Matching Layoffs and Buyouts Who to Target for Layoffs Buyouts Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) PART TWO ORGANIZATIONAL AND JOB DESIGN CHAPTER 5 DECISION MAKING Introduction The Organization of an Economy Markets as Information Systems Markets as Incentive Systems Markets and Innovation Benefits of Central Planning The Market as Metaphor for Organizational Design Benefits of Centralization Economies of Scale or Public Goods Better Use of Central Knowledge Coordination Benefits of Decentralization Specific vs. General Knowledge Other Benefits of Decentralization Authority and Responsibility Decision Making as a Multistage Process Flat vs. Hierarchical Structures Investing in Better Quality Decision Making Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 6 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Introduction Types of Organizational Structures Hierarchy Functional Structure Divisional Structure Matrix or Project Structure Network Structure Which Structure Should a Firm Use? Coordination Two Types of Coordination Problems Coordination Mechanisms Implementation Span of Control and Number of Levels in a Hierarchy Skills, Pay, and Structure Evolution of a Firm’s Structure Summary Study Questions References Further Reading CHAPTER 7 JOB DESIGN Introduction Patterns of Job Design Optimal Job Design: Skills, Tasks, and Decisions Multiskilling and Multitasking Decisions Complementarity and Job Design When to Use Different Job Designs Taylorism Factors Pushing Toward Taylorism or Continuous Improvement Intrinsic Motivation Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 8 ADVANCED JOB DESIGN Introduction Teams Group Decision Making Free Rider Effects When to Use Teams Other Benefits of Team Production Implementation of Teams Team Composition Worker-Owned Firms Effects of Information TechnologyEffects on Organizational Structure Effects on Job Design High Reliability Organizations Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) PART THREE PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE CHAPTER 9 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Introduction Purposes of Performance Evaluation Ways to Evaluate Performance Quantitative Performance Measurement Risk Profile Risk vs. Distortion: Performance Measure Scope Match of the Performance Measure to Job Design Manipulation Subjective Evaluation Why Use Subjective Evaluations? The Benefits of Subjective Evaluations Practical Considerations Summary Study Questions References Further Reading CHAPTER 10 REWARDING PERFORMANCE Introduction How Strong Should Incentives Be? Intuition Imperfect Evaluations and Optimal Incentives Summary: How Strong Should Incentives Be? Paying for Performance: Common Examples Rewards or Penalties? Lump Sums, Demotions, or Promotions Caps on Rewards Applications Profit Sharing and ESOPs Organizational Form and Contracting Motivating Creativity Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 11 CAREER-BASED INCENTIVES Introduction Promotions and Incentives Should Promotions be Used as an Incentive System? Promotion Rule: Tournament or Standard? How Do Promotions Generate Incentives? Advanced Issues Turnover Evidence Career Concerns Seniority Pay and Incentives Practical Considerations Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 12 OPTIONS AND EXECUTIVE PAY Introduction Employee Stock Options Stock Options–A Brief Overview Should Firms Grant Employees Options? Options as Incentive Pay Executive Pay What is the Most Important Question? Executive Pay for Performance Other Incentives & Controls Do Executive Incentives Matter? Summary Employee Stock Options Executive Pay Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) PART FOUR APPLICATIONS CHAPTER 13 BENEFITS Introduction Wages vs. Benefits Why Offer Benefits? Cost Advantage Value Advantage Government Mandate Implementation of Benefits Improving Employee Sorting Cafeteria Plans Pensions Paid Time Off Summary Study Questions References Further Reading CHAPTER 14 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INTRAPRENEURSHIP Introduction Entrepreneurship The Choice to become an Entrepreneur Intrapreneurship Internal Markets Creativity vs. Control Speed of Decision Making Reducing Bureaucracy Continuous Improvement Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 15 THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP Introduction Employment as an Economic Transaction Perfect Competition Imperfect Competition Complex Contracting Summary Communication between Management and Workers Communication from Management to Workers Communication from Workers to Management The Decision to Empower Workers Improving Cooperation From the Prisoner’s Dilemma to Employment Reputation and the Employment Relationship Investing in Reputation Summary Personnel Economics in Practice Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) GLOSSARY INDEX

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