Peace and War

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN is Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a military analyst for ABC News. A frequent commentator on National Public Radio, he is the author of numerous books on security issues and has served in a number of senior positions in the US government.

• Contents1Assessing the Conventional Balance1The Conventional Balance3Counting Total Forces5Deciding What to Count5The Strengths and Weaknesses of Manpower Numbers7The Strengths and Weaknesses of Equipment Numbers8Dealing with Force Quantity and Force Quality82Arab-Israeli Military Efforts and Arms Transfers11Differences in the Size of National Economies and in the Level of Military Effort12Problems in Dollar Comparisons of Military Expenditures and Arms Sales16What Can Be Learned from Comparisons of Military Expenditures19Syrian Military Expenditures20Jordanian Military Expenditures21Egyptian Military Expenditures22Lebanese Military Expenditures24Israeli Military Expenditures25###8220;Haves###8221; versus ###8220;Have Nots###8221;29Relative Efficiency in Using Military Expenditures29Comparisons of Arms Sales and Imports32The Impact of US Military Assistance443Comparing Arab-Israeli Forces by Service and Country55Understanding the Details Behind Quantitative Comparisons of Total Forces59Total Force Strength and Differences in National Force Structure59Israeli Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit Strength59Syrian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit Strength61Jordanian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit Strength62Lebanese Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit Strength64Egyptian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit Strength65The Importance of Reserve Forces and Strategic Warning67viiiContentsHigh-Quality Weapons versus Total Weapons71Main Battle Tanks73Other Armored Fighting Vehicles81Anti-Tank Weapons87Artillery Forces90Multiple Rocket Launchers98Mortars99Advanced Artillery Warfare Capability100Combat Aircraft101Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the IAF107Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the Syrian Air Force117Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the Jordanian Air Force120Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the Egyptian Air Force121Attack and Armed Helicopters123Israeli Combat Helicopter Forces124Arab Combat Helicopter Forces126Major Surface-to-Air Missile Defenses127Israeli Land-Based Air Defenses128Syrian Land-Based Air Defenses129Jordanian Land-Based Air Defenses130Egyptian Land-Based Air Defenses131Short-Range Air Defenses132Israeli Short-Range Air Defenses132Syrian Short-Range Air Defenses133Jordanian Short-Range Air Defenses133Egyptian Short-Range Air Defenses133The Size and Role of Naval Forces134Israeli Naval Forces136Syrian Naval Forces139Jordanian Naval Forces140Lebanese Naval Forces140Egyptian Naval Forces141The Inevitable Limits of Quantitative Comparisons1444###8220;Intangibles###8221;: Arab-Israeli Force Quality147The Israeli ###8220;Edge###8221;147Arab Organizational, Resource, Political, and ###8220;Cultural###8221; Problems150The Qualitative Weaknesses in Most Middle Eastern Military Forces153The Qualitative Advantages of Israeli Forces157The Limits of Israel###8217;s Qualitative ###8220;Edge###8221;1635Comparing Arab-Israeli War Fighting Capability1676The Israeli ###8220;Edge###8221;: Strengths and Weaknesses173ContentsixKeeping the ###8220;Edge###8221;?177Israeli Military Technology, Equipment Buys, and Arms Transfers178Israeli Force Trends179Israeli Military Manpower182The Problem of Peace and Bureaucratization184The Problem of Conscription185The Uncertain Role of Women186The Changing Role of Reserves187Morale, Motivation, and Money188Willingness to Serve and Willingness to Take Casualties188Numbers versus Quality versus Money189Israeli Land Forces190Israeli Air Forces191Israeli Naval Forces195Israeli Long-Range Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction195Israeli Criticisms of the IDF and Fears That Israel Is Losing Its ###8220;Edge###8221;197The Wald Report198The Barak Reforms199Reforms Since Barak200Israel###8217;s Continuing Strategic Debate201The Creation of a National Security Council, ###8220;Zahal 2000,###8221; ###8220;Idan 2003,###8221; and ###8220;Idan 2010###8221;207The Barak Government and Idan 20102117Israeli-Palestinian Conflicts215Peace with Violence versus a Second Intifada: The Nature of Asymmetric Warfare226The ###8220;Military Balance###8221;: The Actors That Would Challenge the IDF in a Second Intifada234Palestinian Paramilitary Groups235The Role of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad239Hamas243Islamic Jihad251Outside Actors: Palestinians in Lebanon, the Hizbollah, and Iran254Palestinian Hard-Line Movements in Syria and Jordan257Israeli Hard-Line Movements and Extremists260The History and Effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces260The Palestinian Authority versus Hamas and the PIJ261The Effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces262The Organization of the Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza and the West Bank264Conflict in Gaza270Fighting in an Economic and Demographic Time Bomb271The Forms the Fighting Might Take in the Gaza275xContentsConflict on the West Bank280The West Bank Version of the Economic and Demographic Time Bomb283Major Security Issues on the West Bank285The Problem of Palestinian Sovereignty and the Final Settlement Issues287The Problem of Demographics and the Right of Return288The Problem of Economics290The Problem of Jerusalem290The Problem of West Bank Security293The Problem of Water295The Impact of the Security Arrangements on the West Bank296The Israeli-Palestinian Accords296Possible Wars on the West Bank300Israeli Tactics in a West Bank Conflict300The Palestinian Response302The Costs of Fighting and Possible Aftermaths306Cyber-Conflict on the Web307If Peace Should Fail for Years: ###8220;Violence without Peace###8221;308A Possible Drift Towards Military and Political Extremism308Possible Israeli Tactics in a Prolonged Conflict310Prolonged Conflict, ###8220;Separation,###8221; and Evacuation313The Role of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iran, and Hizbollah in a Longer Conflict in Gaza or the West Bank314If Peace Does Ever Come: The Cost of Living with ###8220;Peace with Violence###8221;315Palestinian Authority Security Operations and ###8220;Mission Impossible###8221;316Israeli Criticisms and the Art of the Possible318###8220;Peace With Abuses###8221; versus ###8220;Peace With Violence###8221;319The Palestinian Authority Response319The Israeli Security Response324The Cost-Effectiveness of Security Measures328A Cold Peace and the Possible Role of Neutral Observers3308Israeli-Syrian Conflicts333Syrian Capabilities in War Fighting339Syrian Modernization, Military Spending, and Arms Imports340Syrian Land Forces349Syrian Air and Air Defense Forces350The Strategic and Tactical Impact of the Golan351The Golan and Israel###8217;s Overall Supply of Water354The Impact of Giving up the Golan357War Fighting on the Golan358Mobilization, Surprise, and Mass359Expanding the Depth of the Golan Battlefield360Israeli ###8220;Soft Strike###8221; Capabilities in Strategic Bombing362A New Type of War?363ContentsxiSyrian Risk Taking363An Attack Through the Golan After a Syrian-Israeli Peace Settlement364The Value of the Golan to Syria in an Attack on Israel364Can the Golan Stay Partially Divided?366Creating a Secure Peace on the Golan369The Military Aspects of the Israeli and Syrian Positions370Force Limitation Measures and Confidence-Building Measures371Observation Points, Sensors, and Transparency372The Role of a Peacekeeping or Observer Force and the Role of the US373US Presence in a Peacekeeping Force374A US-Israeli Strategic Alliance375US ###8220;Extended Deterrence###8221;378Including Arab States3789Wars Involving Lebanon381A History of Civil War381The Lebanese Military Forces385The Lebanese Army386The Lebanese Air Force and Navy392The Syrian Military Presence in Lebanon393Syrian Forces in Lebanon and Possible Creation of a Second Front against Israel395The Hizbollah and the Proxy War in Lebanon397The Evolution of the Hizbollah398Foreign Support for the Hizbollah400The Size and Armament of Hizbollah404The Role of the Hizbollah in Military and Terrorist Actions405Amal in Military and Terrorist Actions407The South Lebanon Army407Israel###8217;s Defeat in Lebanon: An Israeli Vietnam?410The Basic Military Situation411The Fighting Through 1995412The Disaster of Operation Grapes of Wrath413Trying to Fight Guerrillas on Their Own Terms414Blundering Towards Withdrawal417Sensors and Electronic Fences420Air Raids, ###8220;Massive Retaliation,###8221; and Collapse421Syria, Israel, and Lebanon With or Without the Peace Process423Israeli Defense Options423Peace as a Defense426The UNIFIL Option427The Future Threat to Israel Proper###8212;With and Without a Peace43210Jordanian-Israeli Conflicts437Jordan###8217;s Military Forces438xiiContentsJordanian Support of Palestinian Forces in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel444Jordanian ###8220;Rescue###8221; of Palestinians in the West Bank: Jordanian Re-Occupation of the West Bank451Arms Control and Security Implications45211A Jordanian-Syrian Alliance, Turkey, and Wars on the Eastern Front455If Jordan Should Join Syria455A Jordanian Role in a Broader Alliance Against Israel459The Israeli (Jordanian) Alliance with Turkey46012Egyptian-Israeli Conflicts463Egyptian War Fighting Capabilities470Egyptian Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers475Egyptian Land Forces475Egyptian Air Forces478Egyptian Naval Forces479An Egyptian-Israeli Conflict in the Sinai480Egyptian Defensive Capabilities481Egyptian Offensive Capabilities481Arms Control in the Sinai484Egypt###8217;s Impact on Peace Negotiations and Arms Control48613###8220;Worst Case###8221; Conventional Wars: Israel Fights Egypt, Jordan, and Syria with Support from Other Arab States48714Wars Involving Libyan, Iranian, Iraqi, and Other Arab Conventional Forces497Libyan Capabilities502Iranian Capabilities503Iraqi Capabilities505The Impact of Libyan, Iranian, Iraqi, and Other Arab Conventional Capabilities50615Wars Using Weapons of Mass Destruction509Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction509Israeli Nuclear Weapons512Israeli Nuclear Delivery Systems519Israeli Chemical and Biological Weapons526Israeli Deterrent and Strategic Doctrine and Planning527Israeli Missile Defenses529Israeli National Programs530The Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) or Nautilus530ContentsxiiiThe Patriot and PAC-3531The Arrow532The Integrated Boost-Phase Intercept System and Moab534Warning and Command and Control535The Interoperable Defense Effort: Israeli and US Cooperation536The Complex Structure of the Full Israeli Missile Defense Program537Israeli Civil Defense538Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction539Syrian Missile Programs539Syrian and Other Regional Use of Commercial Satellite Imagery542Syrian Missile Conversions and Cruise Missiles543Syrian Aircraft Delivery Systems544Syrian Chemical Weapons544Syrian Biological Weapons546Syrian Strategy, Doctrine, and Plans548Egyptian Weapons of Mass Destruction549Egyptian Missile Programs549Egyptian Chemical Weapons551Egyptian Biological and Nuclear Weapons552Algerian, Libyan, Iranian, and Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction553Algeria553Libya555Libyan Delivery Systems555Libyan Chemical Warfare Programs556Libyan Biological Programs558Libyan Nuclear Programs558Libyan War Fighting Capability559Iran560Iranian Delivery Systems560Iranian Chemical Warfare Capabilities572Iranian Biological Warfare Capabilities578Iranian Nuclear Warfare Capabilities579Iranian War Fighting Options588Iraq588Iraq###8217;s Current Delivery Capabilities589Iraqi Chemical Weapons595Iraq###8217;s Biological Warfare Capabilities599Iraq###8217;s Nuclear Warfare Capabilities603Iraq###8217;s War Fighting Capabilities607Proliferation and the Greater Middle East609The War Fighting Implications of Weapons of Mass Destruction609Arab and Iranian Forces and Capabilities610Israeli Forces and Capabilities611The Evolving War Fighting and Arms Control Implications of Weapons of Mass Destruction613The Arms Control Implications of Weapons of Mass Destruction617xivContents16Deterrence, Arms Control, and Regional Stability625Self-Stabilizing Deterrence626The Nations Inside the Peace Process626The Nations Outside the Peace Process628The Stabilizing Role of the US630US Intervention in an Arab-Israel Conflict631The Impact of US Military Assistance632Beyond Conventional Deterrence633The Impact of the Peace Process, Low-Intensity Combat, and the Palestinian Problem633The Impact of Jordan634The Impact of Syria, the Golan, and Lebanon634The Impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction635Implications for Arms Control63617Sources and Methods639Sources639Methods641Notes643Bibliography697