Born in 1941 in Kassel, Germany, Manfred Wilke received his PhD in economic and social sciences from the University of Bremen in 1976 and his post-doctoral degree in sociology from Freie Universität Berlin in 1981. From 1985–2006, he was Professor of Sociology at the Berlin School of Economics, during which he participated in both Enquête Commissions of the German Bundestag on the history of the SED dictatorship. He also served as Research Director of the Research Association on the SED State at Freie Universität Berlin from 1992–2006.

• ForewordList of AbbreviationsMap of Germany, 1949–89Map of Berlin, 1949–89IntroductionPART I: THE POLARIZATION OF POSTWAR EUROPEChapter 1. The Allied War Conferences and Europe’s Postwar OrderThe United States of America and the Anti-Hitler Coalition’s Goals for Peace: The Atlantic Charter of 1941The Soviet Precedent in 1944 Poland and Churchill’s Warning about the Iron Curtain in 1945Yalta: Controlling Germany without Dismembering ItGermany’s Forced ReorientationLiberation and Occupation RuleThe Question of GuiltEmerging from Catastrophe: Konrad Adenauer, Kurt Schumacher, and Walter UlbrichtPotsdam 1945Chapter 2. New Borders for GermanyPoland’s Borders and the Separation of Austria and the Eastern ProvincesThe Demarcation Lines of the Occupation ZonesReparations BordersBerlin: The Four-Sector CityInterzonal Trade: An Economic Safety Pin Holding Together the Divided CountryThe Interzonal Pass: First Efforts to Control Travel to and from the EastThe Inter-German Emigration Movement, 1945–1989/90Chapter 3. Two German StatesConflicts over the German Party System and the Democratic Elections of 1946The Establishment of Communist Party Rule in the Soviet ZoneMoscow Plans, 1944The Soviet Military Administration and the Establishment of a Communist Party DictatorshipThe German Economic Commission: Preparations to Found the New StateThe “Party of Power”: Party Cleansing and the Stalinization of the SEDThe Founding of the GDRThe Federal Republic of Germany: The West German StatePreliminary Decisions at the Conference of Foreign Ministers, Paris, 1946The Bizone: A Decision to Rebuild GermanyFundamental Decisions for the West German StateCurrency Reform and the Social Market EconomyA Constituent Assembly for West GermanyThe Marshall PlanThe European Coal and Steel CommunityThe Founding of the Federal Republic and the German Basic LawChapter 4. Western Integration and the Establishment of Socialism: Competing Systems in a Divided GermanyThe Federal Republic: Western Integration and the Reclamation of German SovereigntyThe Federal Republic’s Alignment to the West and Stalin’s Peace Note of 1952The GDR in 1952: “Building the Foundations of Socialism”Cementing the Zonal Border and Sealing Off West Berlin from Its Surrounding AreaBuilding Socialism in the GDR and Relations to the Federal RepublicChapter 6. The End of the Postwar Period: The Geneva Summit and the Transition to “Peaceful Coexistence” in GermanyThe Geneva Summit of 1955The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, and the “Hallstein Doctrine”Peaceful Coexistence in a Divided Germany: The Two-State Doctrine, Plans for a Confederation, and the Rapacki PlanSputnik and the End of America’s “Massive Retaliation” StrategyNuclear Missiles for the Bundeswehr?The Founding of the European Economic CommunityPART II: THE FIGHT FOR BERLINChapter 6. The First Berlin Crisis, 1948–49Berlin’s Historical Significance for the Division of GermanyPivotal Conflicts over Berlin’s Political Order after the End of the WarBerlin as a Soviet Lever to Shift the Zones of Influence in GermanyThe Conflict over Berlin’s Currency Reform, the Blockade, and the AirliftThe Division of the CityThe Ring around Berlin: A New BorderCrisis Management as Super-Power DiplomacyChapter 7. Stalin’s Death and the First Existential Crisis of the GDR: 17 June 1953A “New Course” for the SEDThe SED State’s Crisis of Legitimacy: 17 June 1953The Soviet Union Guarantees the Existence of the SED StateWestern Initiatives toward New Negotiations on GermanyRecognition and Stabilization of the GDRChapter 8. A Prelude to the Second Berlin Crisis: The SED Party CongressThe Fifth Party Congress of the SED, 1958The Question of a Peace Treaty with GermanyKhrushchev Demands a Peace Agreement and a Solution to the “Westberlin Problem”SED Propaganda and the West Berlin Elections of 1958Chapter 9. The Soviet Union’s 1958 Berlin UltimatumA Bolt of Lightning: Khrushchev’s Speech on 10 November 1958Khrushchev’s MotivesThe Berlin UltimatumMultiple Reactions from the WestChapter 10. Negotiations over a Peace Treaty and the “Free City of Westberlin”Moscow DraftsUlbricht’s Plans: Full Sovereignty and a Solution to the “Westberlin Problem”The Transfer of Soviet Rights in Berlin to the Government of the GDRThe “Free City of Westberlin”: The Statute by the SEDThe Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1959Chapter 11. The Second Berlin Crisis and a Shift in the Cold WarThe International Character of the Second Berlin CrisisThe Soviet–Chinese Schism and the Position of the SEDKhrushchev’s Trip to the United States in 1959The Summit that Khrushchev Cut Short: Paris 1960Chapter 12. Crisis in the GDR, Changes to the Border Regime, and Interzonal TradeA Supply Crisis and the Exodus Movement from the GDRBorder Controls and Special Permits to Enter East BerlinThe Conflict over Interzonal TradeNegotiations on Interzonal TradeChapter 13. Ulbricht: Resolve the “Westberlin Question” Now!The Status Quo in Berlin before Khrushchev’s Summit with President KennedyUlbricht Pushes for a Solution to the “Westberlin Question,” 1961Khrushchev’s Timeframe in March 1961Chapter 14. The Vienna Summit, 1961: The Second Soviet UltimatumMoscow’s Expectations before the SummitKennedy: Balancing Détente and an Assertion of the Western PositionsConfrontation at the Summit: Khrushchev’s “Vienna Ultimatum”The Outcome: A Policy of ForceThe SED’s Reaction to Khrushchev’s “Vienna Ultimatum”Chapter 15. The Decision to Close the Sector Border in Berlin“No One Has the Intention of Building a Wall”Ulbricht Demands Closing the Sector Border in BerlinSecrecy and Conspiratorial CommunicationKennedy’s Three Essentials and Khrushchev’s ResponseChapter 16. The Construction of the Berlin Wall, 1961: Germany’s Division Gains a Symbol“They Will Feel Your Power!”: Khrushchev and Ulbricht on the Wall’s ConstructionWest Germany Is Superior: The GDR’s Economic CrisisLegitimizing the Border Closure through the Warsaw PactThe Operation to Close the Border: Planning and Troop Deployment13 August 1961: The Division of BerlinThe SED Mobilizes its Party against “Desertion of the Republic”The Decision by the Council of Ministers on 12 AugustBarbed Wire through BerlinRegulations at the BorderThe Border Regime: The Wall and the Command to ShootPART III: THE END OF THE SECOND BERLIN CRISISChapter 17. Negotiations, but No War!13 August and the Berlin Crisis: Berlin–Bonn–WashingtonKhrushchev and the German Question after the Construction of the WallConflicting Positions among the Western Powers, and Kennedy’s Decision to NegotiateChapter 18. A Wall in Berlin but No Peace Treaty with the GDRThe Retraction of Khrushchev’s UltimatumMilitary Exercises for an Unwanted War over BerlinUlbricht Demands a Peace TreatyThe Confrontation of Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie in October 1961Khrushchev Approves Strengthening the BorderExploratory Discussions on a Berlin SettlementKhrushchev’s Change of Course: Negotiations, but No AgreementChapter 19. Repercussions for Germany and a Shift in Trouble SpotsUlbricht and the New SituationAdenauer’s Conflict with Kennedy over the Transit Routes to West BerlinGermany Policy, or the Importance of Holding OnFrom the Berlin Crisis to the Cuban Missile CrisisConclusion: Who Was Responsible for the Berlin Wall?BibliographyList of PersonsAbout the Author

“...constitutes a superlative model of combining biography with the study of nationalism. The latter constitutes the most novel contribution of this well-researched, straightforward historical depiction of Kohl’s ideology and its impact upon the continuing development of German national identity... Recommended” · Choice

Born in 1941 in Kassel, Germany, Manfred Wilke received his PhD in economic and social sciences from the University of Bremen in 1976 and his post-doctoral degree in sociology from Freie Universität Berlin in 1981. From 1985–2006, he was Professor of Sociology at the Berlin School of Economics, during which he participated in both Enquête Commissions of the German Bundestag on the history of the SED dictatorship. He also served as Research Director of the Research Association on the SED State at Freie Universität Berlin from 1992–2006.

• ForewordList of AbbreviationsMap of Germany, 1949–89Map of Berlin, 1949–89IntroductionPART I: THE POLARIZATION OF POSTWAR EUROPEChapter 1. The Allied War Conferences and Europe’s Postwar OrderThe United States of America and the Anti-Hitler Coalition’s Goals for Peace: The Atlantic Charter of 1941The Soviet Precedent in 1944 Poland and Churchill’s Warning about the Iron Curtain in 1945Yalta: Controlling Germany without Dismembering ItGermany’s Forced ReorientationLiberation and Occupation RuleThe Question of GuiltEmerging from Catastrophe: Konrad Adenauer, Kurt Schumacher, and Walter UlbrichtPotsdam 1945Chapter 2. New Borders for GermanyPoland’s Borders and the Separation of Austria and the Eastern ProvincesThe Demarcation Lines of the Occupation ZonesReparations BordersBerlin: The Four-Sector CityInterzonal Trade: An Economic Safety Pin Holding Together the Divided CountryThe Interzonal Pass: First Efforts to Control Travel to and from the EastThe Inter-German Emigration Movement, 1945–1989/90Chapter 3. Two German StatesConflicts over the German Party System and the Democratic Elections of 1946The Establishment of Communist Party Rule in the Soviet ZoneMoscow Plans, 1944The Soviet Military Administration and the Establishment of a Communist Party DictatorshipThe German Economic Commission: Preparations to Found the New StateThe “Party of Power”: Party Cleansing and the Stalinization of the SEDThe Founding of the GDRThe Federal Republic of Germany: The West German StatePreliminary Decisions at the Conference of Foreign Ministers, Paris, 1946The Bizone: A Decision to Rebuild GermanyFundamental Decisions for the West German StateCurrency Reform and the Social Market EconomyA Constituent Assembly for West GermanyThe Marshall PlanThe European Coal and Steel CommunityThe Founding of the Federal Republic and the German Basic LawChapter 4. Western Integration and the Establishment of Socialism: Competing Systems in a Divided GermanyThe Federal Republic: Western Integration and the Reclamation of German SovereigntyThe Federal Republic’s Alignment to the West and Stalin’s Peace Note of 1952The GDR in 1952: “Building the Foundations of Socialism”Cementing the Zonal Border and Sealing Off West Berlin from Its Surrounding AreaBuilding Socialism in the GDR and Relations to the Federal RepublicChapter 6. The End of the Postwar Period: The Geneva Summit and the Transition to “Peaceful Coexistence” in GermanyThe Geneva Summit of 1955The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, and the “Hallstein Doctrine”Peaceful Coexistence in a Divided Germany: The Two-State Doctrine, Plans for a Confederation, and the Rapacki PlanSputnik and the End of America’s “Massive Retaliation” StrategyNuclear Missiles for the Bundeswehr?The Founding of the European Economic CommunityPART II: THE FIGHT FOR BERLINChapter 6. The First Berlin Crisis, 1948–49Berlin’s Historical Significance for the Division of GermanyPivotal Conflicts over Berlin’s Political Order after the End of the WarBerlin as a Soviet Lever to Shift the Zones of Influence in GermanyThe Conflict over Berlin’s Currency Reform, the Blockade, and the AirliftThe Division of the CityThe Ring around Berlin: A New BorderCrisis Management as Super-Power DiplomacyChapter 7. Stalin’s Death and the First Existential Crisis of the GDR: 17 June 1953A “New Course” for the SEDThe SED State’s Crisis of Legitimacy: 17 June 1953The Soviet Union Guarantees the Existence of the SED StateWestern Initiatives toward New Negotiations on GermanyRecognition and Stabilization of the GDRChapter 8. A Prelude to the Second Berlin Crisis: The SED Party CongressThe Fifth Party Congress of the SED, 1958The Question of a Peace Treaty with GermanyKhrushchev Demands a Peace Agreement and a Solution to the “Westberlin Problem”SED Propaganda and the West Berlin Elections of 1958Chapter 9. The Soviet Union’s 1958 Berlin UltimatumA Bolt of Lightning: Khrushchev’s Speech on 10 November 1958Khrushchev’s MotivesThe Berlin UltimatumMultiple Reactions from the WestChapter 10. Negotiations over a Peace Treaty and the “Free City of Westberlin”Moscow DraftsUlbricht’s Plans: Full Sovereignty and a Solution to the “Westberlin Problem”The Transfer of Soviet Rights in Berlin to the Government of the GDRThe “Free City of Westberlin”: The Statute by the SEDThe Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1959Chapter 11. The Second Berlin Crisis and a Shift in the Cold WarThe International Character of the Second Berlin CrisisThe Soviet–Chinese Schism and the Position of the SEDKhrushchev’s Trip to the United States in 1959The Summit that Khrushchev Cut Short: Paris 1960Chapter 12. Crisis in the GDR, Changes to the Border Regime, and Interzonal TradeA Supply Crisis and the Exodus Movement from the GDRBorder Controls and Special Permits to Enter East BerlinThe Conflict over Interzonal TradeNegotiations on Interzonal TradeChapter 13. Ulbricht: Resolve the “Westberlin Question” Now!The Status Quo in Berlin before Khrushchev’s Summit with President KennedyUlbricht Pushes for a Solution to the “Westberlin Question,” 1961Khrushchev’s Timeframe in March 1961Chapter 14. The Vienna Summit, 1961: The Second Soviet UltimatumMoscow’s Expectations before the SummitKennedy: Balancing Détente and an Assertion of the Western PositionsConfrontation at the Summit: Khrushchev’s “Vienna Ultimatum”The Outcome: A Policy of ForceThe SED’s Reaction to Khrushchev’s “Vienna Ultimatum”Chapter 15. The Decision to Close the Sector Border in Berlin“No One Has the Intention of Building a Wall”Ulbricht Demands Closing the Sector Border in BerlinSecrecy and Conspiratorial CommunicationKennedy’s Three Essentials and Khrushchev’s ResponseChapter 16. The Construction of the Berlin Wall, 1961: Germany’s Division Gains a Symbol“They Will Feel Your Power!”: Khrushchev and Ulbricht on the Wall’s ConstructionWest Germany Is Superior: The GDR’s Economic CrisisLegitimizing the Border Closure through the Warsaw PactThe Operation to Close the Border: Planning and Troop Deployment13 August 1961: The Division of BerlinThe SED Mobilizes its Party against “Desertion of the Republic”The Decision by the Council of Ministers on 12 AugustBarbed Wire through BerlinRegulations at the BorderThe Border Regime: The Wall and the Command to ShootPART III: THE END OF THE SECOND BERLIN CRISISChapter 17. Negotiations, but No War!13 August and the Berlin Crisis: Berlin–Bonn–WashingtonKhrushchev and the German Question after the Construction of the WallConflicting Positions among the Western Powers, and Kennedy’s Decision to NegotiateChapter 18. A Wall in Berlin but No Peace Treaty with the GDRThe Retraction of Khrushchev’s UltimatumMilitary Exercises for an Unwanted War over BerlinUlbricht Demands a Peace TreatyThe Confrontation of Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie in October 1961Khrushchev Approves Strengthening the BorderExploratory Discussions on a Berlin SettlementKhrushchev’s Change of Course: Negotiations, but No AgreementChapter 19. Repercussions for Germany and a Shift in Trouble SpotsUlbricht and the New SituationAdenauer’s Conflict with Kennedy over the Transit Routes to West BerlinGermany Policy, or the Importance of Holding OnFrom the Berlin Crisis to the Cuban Missile CrisisConclusion: Who Was Responsible for the Berlin Wall?BibliographyList of PersonsAbout the Author

“...constitutes a superlative model of combining biography with the study of nationalism. The latter constitutes the most novel contribution of this well-researched, straightforward historical depiction of Kohl’s ideology and its impact upon the continuing development of German national identity... Recommended” · Choice

Born in 1941 in Kassel, Germany, Manfred Wilke received his PhD in economic and social sciences from the University of Bremen in 1976 and his post-doctoral degree in sociology from Freie Universität Berlin in 1981. From 1985–2006, he was Professor of Sociology at the Berlin School of Economics, during which he participated in both Enquête Commissions of the German Bundestag on the history of the SED dictatorship. He also served as Research Director of the Research Association on the SED State at Freie Universität Berlin from 1992–2006.

• ForewordList of AbbreviationsMap of Germany, 1949–89Map of Berlin, 1949–89IntroductionPART I: THE POLARIZATION OF POSTWAR EUROPEChapter 1. The Allied War Conferences and Europe’s Postwar OrderThe United States of America and the Anti-Hitler Coalition’s Goals for Peace: The Atlantic Charter of 1941The Soviet Precedent in 1944 Poland and Churchill’s Warning about the Iron Curtain in 1945Yalta: Controlling Germany without Dismembering ItGermany’s Forced ReorientationLiberation and Occupation RuleThe Question of GuiltEmerging from Catastrophe: Konrad Adenauer, Kurt Schumacher, and Walter UlbrichtPotsdam 1945Chapter 2. New Borders for GermanyPoland’s Borders and the Separation of Austria and the Eastern ProvincesThe Demarcation Lines of the Occupation ZonesReparations BordersBerlin: The Four-Sector CityInterzonal Trade: An Economic Safety Pin Holding Together the Divided CountryThe Interzonal Pass: First Efforts to Control Travel to and from the EastThe Inter-German Emigration Movement, 1945–1989/90Chapter 3. Two German StatesConflicts over the German Party System and the Democratic Elections of 1946The Establishment of Communist Party Rule in the Soviet ZoneMoscow Plans, 1944The Soviet Military Administration and the Establishment of a Communist Party DictatorshipThe German Economic Commission: Preparations to Found the New StateThe “Party of Power”: Party Cleansing and the Stalinization of the SEDThe Founding of the GDRThe Federal Republic of Germany: The West German StatePreliminary Decisions at the Conference of Foreign Ministers, Paris, 1946The Bizone: A Decision to Rebuild GermanyFundamental Decisions for the West German StateCurrency Reform and the Social Market EconomyA Constituent Assembly for West GermanyThe Marshall PlanThe European Coal and Steel CommunityThe Founding of the Federal Republic and the German Basic LawChapter 4. Western Integration and the Establishment of Socialism: Competing Systems in a Divided GermanyThe Federal Republic: Western Integration and the Reclamation of German SovereigntyThe Federal Republic’s Alignment to the West and Stalin’s Peace Note of 1952The GDR in 1952: “Building the Foundations of Socialism”Cementing the Zonal Border and Sealing Off West Berlin from Its Surrounding AreaBuilding Socialism in the GDR and Relations to the Federal RepublicChapter 6. The End of the Postwar Period: The Geneva Summit and the Transition to “Peaceful Coexistence” in GermanyThe Geneva Summit of 1955The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, and the “Hallstein Doctrine”Peaceful Coexistence in a Divided Germany: The Two-State Doctrine, Plans for a Confederation, and the Rapacki PlanSputnik and the End of America’s “Massive Retaliation” StrategyNuclear Missiles for the Bundeswehr?The Founding of the European Economic CommunityPART II: THE FIGHT FOR BERLINChapter 6. The First Berlin Crisis, 1948–49Berlin’s Historical Significance for the Division of GermanyPivotal Conflicts over Berlin’s Political Order after the End of the WarBerlin as a Soviet Lever to Shift the Zones of Influence in GermanyThe Conflict over Berlin’s Currency Reform, the Blockade, and the AirliftThe Division of the CityThe Ring around Berlin: A New BorderCrisis Management as Super-Power DiplomacyChapter 7. Stalin’s Death and the First Existential Crisis of the GDR: 17 June 1953A “New Course” for the SEDThe SED State’s Crisis of Legitimacy: 17 June 1953The Soviet Union Guarantees the Existence of the SED StateWestern Initiatives toward New Negotiations on GermanyRecognition and Stabilization of the GDRChapter 8. A Prelude to the Second Berlin Crisis: The SED Party CongressThe Fifth Party Congress of the SED, 1958The Question of a Peace Treaty with GermanyKhrushchev Demands a Peace Agreement and a Solution to the “Westberlin Problem”SED Propaganda and the West Berlin Elections of 1958Chapter 9. The Soviet Union’s 1958 Berlin UltimatumA Bolt of Lightning: Khrushchev’s Speech on 10 November 1958Khrushchev’s MotivesThe Berlin UltimatumMultiple Reactions from the WestChapter 10. Negotiations over a Peace Treaty and the “Free City of Westberlin”Moscow DraftsUlbricht’s Plans: Full Sovereignty and a Solution to the “Westberlin Problem”The Transfer of Soviet Rights in Berlin to the Government of the GDRThe “Free City of Westberlin”: The Statute by the SEDThe Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1959Chapter 11. The Second Berlin Crisis and a Shift in the Cold WarThe International Character of the Second Berlin CrisisThe Soviet–Chinese Schism and the Position of the SEDKhrushchev’s Trip to the United States in 1959The Summit that Khrushchev Cut Short: Paris 1960Chapter 12. Crisis in the GDR, Changes to the Border Regime, and Interzonal TradeA Supply Crisis and the Exodus Movement from the GDRBorder Controls and Special Permits to Enter East BerlinThe Conflict over Interzonal TradeNegotiations on Interzonal TradeChapter 13. Ulbricht: Resolve the “Westberlin Question” Now!The Status Quo in Berlin before Khrushchev’s Summit with President KennedyUlbricht Pushes for a Solution to the “Westberlin Question,” 1961Khrushchev’s Timeframe in March 1961Chapter 14. The Vienna Summit, 1961: The Second Soviet UltimatumMoscow’s Expectations before the SummitKennedy: Balancing Détente and an Assertion of the Western PositionsConfrontation at the Summit: Khrushchev’s “Vienna Ultimatum”The Outcome: A Policy of ForceThe SED’s Reaction to Khrushchev’s “Vienna Ultimatum”Chapter 15. The Decision to Close the Sector Border in Berlin“No One Has the Intention of Building a Wall”Ulbricht Demands Closing the Sector Border in BerlinSecrecy and Conspiratorial CommunicationKennedy’s Three Essentials and Khrushchev’s ResponseChapter 16. The Construction of the Berlin Wall, 1961: Germany’s Division Gains a Symbol“They Will Feel Your Power!”: Khrushchev and Ulbricht on the Wall’s ConstructionWest Germany Is Superior: The GDR’s Economic CrisisLegitimizing the Border Closure through the Warsaw PactThe Operation to Close the Border: Planning and Troop Deployment13 August 1961: The Division of BerlinThe SED Mobilizes its Party against “Desertion of the Republic”The Decision by the Council of Ministers on 12 AugustBarbed Wire through BerlinRegulations at the BorderThe Border Regime: The Wall and the Command to ShootPART III: THE END OF THE SECOND BERLIN CRISISChapter 17. Negotiations, but No War!13 August and the Berlin Crisis: Berlin–Bonn–WashingtonKhrushchev and the German Question after the Construction of the WallConflicting Positions among the Western Powers, and Kennedy’s Decision to NegotiateChapter 18. A Wall in Berlin but No Peace Treaty with the GDRThe Retraction of Khrushchev’s UltimatumMilitary Exercises for an Unwanted War over BerlinUlbricht Demands a Peace TreatyThe Confrontation of Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie in October 1961Khrushchev Approves Strengthening the BorderExploratory Discussions on a Berlin SettlementKhrushchev’s Change of Course: Negotiations, but No AgreementChapter 19. Repercussions for Germany and a Shift in Trouble SpotsUlbricht and the New SituationAdenauer’s Conflict with Kennedy over the Transit Routes to West BerlinGermany Policy, or the Importance of Holding OnFrom the Berlin Crisis to the Cuban Missile CrisisConclusion: Who Was Responsible for the Berlin Wall?BibliographyList of PersonsAbout the Author

“...constitutes a superlative model of combining biography with the study of nationalism. The latter constitutes the most novel contribution of this well-researched, straightforward historical depiction of Kohl’s ideology and its impact upon the continuing development of German national identity... Recommended” · Choice