Stephan Frühling is Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies CentreAndrew O’Neil is Executive Dean, Faculty of Law and Business at Australian Catholic University

• Introduction1 Realism, institutionalism, and nuclear weapons cooperation2 Nuclear sharing and mutual dependence: Germany and NATO nuclear weapons cooperation3 Local accommodation: Norway and nuclear weapons cooperation in NATO4 Security at arm’s length: US–Japan nuclear weapons cooperation5 Assurance and abandonment: Nuclear weapons in the US–South Korea alliance6 Informal bargaining: Nuclear weapons cooperation and the US–Australia alliance7 Understanding the drivers of nuclear weapons cooperationIndex

'Long a footnote to US nuclear strategy, extended deterrence is rising in salience and urgency as the United States and its allies contend with a deteriorating security environment. This important new study combines historical research, political science, and policy analysis to generate valuable new insights into past and present practices in both Europe and Asia and thereby lays the foundation for future policy development.'Brad Roberts, Director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California'Partners in deterrence offers a fresh perspective on an enduring question: what motivates states to form nuclear alliances? As US alliances in Europe and Asia face growing nuclear threats, strategists would be well-served to understand what brings in security partners - and what helps them stay. This book makes a valuable contribution, blending classic theory with meticulous examination of well-selected case studies to explain contemporary nuclear alliances. By going beyond the traditional fixation on proximate security threats as the main driver of nuclear alliances, the book widens the aperture of contemporary debates, providing a valuable perspective for academics and policymakers alike.'Matthew Kroenig, Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the author of The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

Stephan Frühling is Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies CentreAndrew O’Neil is Executive Dean, Faculty of Law and Business at Australian Catholic University

• Introduction1 Realism, institutionalism, and nuclear weapons cooperation2 Nuclear sharing and mutual dependence: Germany and NATO nuclear weapons cooperation3 Local accommodation: Norway and nuclear weapons cooperation in NATO4 Security at arm’s length: US–Japan nuclear weapons cooperation5 Assurance and abandonment: Nuclear weapons in the US–South Korea alliance6 Informal bargaining: Nuclear weapons cooperation and the US–Australia alliance7 Understanding the drivers of nuclear weapons cooperationIndex

'Long a footnote to US nuclear strategy, extended deterrence is rising in salience and urgency as the United States and its allies contend with a deteriorating security environment. This important new study combines historical research, political science, and policy analysis to generate valuable new insights into past and present practices in both Europe and Asia and thereby lays the foundation for future policy development.'Brad Roberts, Director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California'Partners in deterrence offers a fresh perspective on an enduring question: what motivates states to form nuclear alliances? As US alliances in Europe and Asia face growing nuclear threats, strategists would be well-served to understand what brings in security partners - and what helps them stay. This book makes a valuable contribution, blending classic theory with meticulous examination of well-selected case studies to explain contemporary nuclear alliances. By going beyond the traditional fixation on proximate security threats as the main driver of nuclear alliances, the book widens the aperture of contemporary debates, providing a valuable perspective for academics and policymakers alike.'Matthew Kroenig, Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the author of The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

Stephan Frühling is Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies CentreAndrew O’Neil is Executive Dean, Faculty of Law and Business at Australian Catholic University

• Introduction1 Realism, institutionalism, and nuclear weapons cooperation2 Nuclear sharing and mutual dependence: Germany and NATO nuclear weapons cooperation3 Local accommodation: Norway and nuclear weapons cooperation in NATO4 Security at arm’s length: US–Japan nuclear weapons cooperation5 Assurance and abandonment: Nuclear weapons in the US–South Korea alliance6 Informal bargaining: Nuclear weapons cooperation and the US–Australia alliance7 Understanding the drivers of nuclear weapons cooperationIndex

'Long a footnote to US nuclear strategy, extended deterrence is rising in salience and urgency as the United States and its allies contend with a deteriorating security environment. This important new study combines historical research, political science, and policy analysis to generate valuable new insights into past and present practices in both Europe and Asia and thereby lays the foundation for future policy development.'Brad Roberts, Director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California'Partners in deterrence offers a fresh perspective on an enduring question: what motivates states to form nuclear alliances? As US alliances in Europe and Asia face growing nuclear threats, strategists would be well-served to understand what brings in security partners - and what helps them stay. This book makes a valuable contribution, blending classic theory with meticulous examination of well-selected case studies to explain contemporary nuclear alliances. By going beyond the traditional fixation on proximate security threats as the main driver of nuclear alliances, the book widens the aperture of contemporary debates, providing a valuable perspective for academics and policymakers alike.'Matthew Kroenig, Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the author of The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy