Professor Peter Whelan is a Professor of Law at the School of Law, University of Leeds, where he is the Director of the Centre for Business Law and Practice. He has a PhD in Law from St John's College, University of Cambridge, and is a qualified US Attorney-at-Law. His work on competition law has been cited in European, African and South American judgments. He is a Non-Governmental Advisor to the International Competition Network and is a member of the United Nations Working Group on Cross-Border Cartels. To date Peter has presented his research in over thirty countries, across six continents.

• Context and Background 1: EU-Level Parental Antitrust Liability and the Crucial Issue of Its Legitimacy 2: Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability The Foundations of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability: 'Undertaking' and the Imputation Process 3: 'Undertaking' and Its Legal Implications 4: Determining the Constituent Elements of an Undertaking 5: The Constituent Elements of an Undertaking to Which an Infringement Can Be Imputed The EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 6: The Specifics of the Doctrine: Imputing the Competition Law Violation to the Parent Company 7: The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Impact on the Imposition and Construction of Antitrust Fines 8: The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Interaction with Other Enforcement Policies and Doctrines Legitimacy as 'Justifiability': Rationalising the Existence of Parental Liability for EU Competition Law Violations 9: Deterrence in EU Competition Law and Its Relevance to Parental Liability 10: Employing Deterrence Theory to Justify Parental Liability for Competition Violations 11: The Applicability to EU-Level Enforcement of the Deterrence-Based Justification for Parental Liability Legitimacy as 'Effectiveness': The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Specifics of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 12: The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Scope and Substance of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 13: The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Specific Implications of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability Legitimacy as 'Fairness': The Restraining Effect of Retribution on the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability 14: Retribution and Its Relevance to the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability 15: The Personal Responsibility of the Parent Company for the Competition Law Violation of Its Subsidiary 16: EU Law and Its Consideration of Retribution under the Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 17: A Problematic Mismatch between EU Jurisprudence on Parental Liability and Principle Legitimacy as 'Legality': The Restraining Impact of General Principles of EU Law on the Doctrine of Parental Liability 18: Parental Liability and the Principle of Ne Bis In Idem 19: The EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability and the Presumption of Innocence 20: Justifying in Principle the 100% Shareholding Presumption: An Alternative (Proportionality-Focused) Assessment Ensuring the Legitimacy of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 21: A Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Parental Liability in EU Competition Law

I was very excited at the news of the publication of Professor Whelan's book, Parental Liability in EU Competition Law, and found in it, as I expected, the highest level of scholarly work.

Professor Peter Whelan is a Professor of Law at the School of Law, University of Leeds, where he is the Director of the Centre for Business Law and Practice. He has a PhD in Law from St John's College, University of Cambridge, and is a qualified US Attorney-at-Law. His work on competition law has been cited in European, African and South American judgments. He is a Non-Governmental Advisor to the International Competition Network and is a member of the United Nations Working Group on Cross-Border Cartels. To date Peter has presented his research in over thirty countries, across six continents.

• Context and Background 1: EU-Level Parental Antitrust Liability and the Crucial Issue of Its Legitimacy 2: Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability The Foundations of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability: 'Undertaking' and the Imputation Process 3: 'Undertaking' and Its Legal Implications 4: Determining the Constituent Elements of an Undertaking 5: The Constituent Elements of an Undertaking to Which an Infringement Can Be Imputed The EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 6: The Specifics of the Doctrine: Imputing the Competition Law Violation to the Parent Company 7: The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Impact on the Imposition and Construction of Antitrust Fines 8: The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Interaction with Other Enforcement Policies and Doctrines Legitimacy as 'Justifiability': Rationalising the Existence of Parental Liability for EU Competition Law Violations 9: Deterrence in EU Competition Law and Its Relevance to Parental Liability 10: Employing Deterrence Theory to Justify Parental Liability for Competition Violations 11: The Applicability to EU-Level Enforcement of the Deterrence-Based Justification for Parental Liability Legitimacy as 'Effectiveness': The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Specifics of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 12: The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Scope and Substance of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 13: The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Specific Implications of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability Legitimacy as 'Fairness': The Restraining Effect of Retribution on the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability 14: Retribution and Its Relevance to the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability 15: The Personal Responsibility of the Parent Company for the Competition Law Violation of Its Subsidiary 16: EU Law and Its Consideration of Retribution under the Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 17: A Problematic Mismatch between EU Jurisprudence on Parental Liability and Principle Legitimacy as 'Legality': The Restraining Impact of General Principles of EU Law on the Doctrine of Parental Liability 18: Parental Liability and the Principle of Ne Bis In Idem 19: The EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability and the Presumption of Innocence 20: Justifying in Principle the 100% Shareholding Presumption: An Alternative (Proportionality-Focused) Assessment Ensuring the Legitimacy of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 21: A Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Parental Liability in EU Competition Law

I was very excited at the news of the publication of Professor Whelan's book, Parental Liability in EU Competition Law, and found in it, as I expected, the highest level of scholarly work.

Professor Peter Whelan is a Professor of Law at the School of Law, University of Leeds, where he is the Director of the Centre for Business Law and Practice. He has a PhD in Law from St John's College, University of Cambridge, and is a qualified US Attorney-at-Law. His work on competition law has been cited in European, African and South American judgments. He is a Non-Governmental Advisor to the International Competition Network and is a member of the United Nations Working Group on Cross-Border Cartels. To date Peter has presented his research in over thirty countries, across six continents.

• Context and Background 1: EU-Level Parental Antitrust Liability and the Crucial Issue of Its Legitimacy 2: Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability The Foundations of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability: 'Undertaking' and the Imputation Process 3: 'Undertaking' and Its Legal Implications 4: Determining the Constituent Elements of an Undertaking 5: The Constituent Elements of an Undertaking to Which an Infringement Can Be Imputed The EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 6: The Specifics of the Doctrine: Imputing the Competition Law Violation to the Parent Company 7: The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Impact on the Imposition and Construction of Antitrust Fines 8: The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Interaction with Other Enforcement Policies and Doctrines Legitimacy as 'Justifiability': Rationalising the Existence of Parental Liability for EU Competition Law Violations 9: Deterrence in EU Competition Law and Its Relevance to Parental Liability 10: Employing Deterrence Theory to Justify Parental Liability for Competition Violations 11: The Applicability to EU-Level Enforcement of the Deterrence-Based Justification for Parental Liability Legitimacy as 'Effectiveness': The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Specifics of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 12: The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Scope and Substance of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 13: The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Specific Implications of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability Legitimacy as 'Fairness': The Restraining Effect of Retribution on the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability 14: Retribution and Its Relevance to the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability 15: The Personal Responsibility of the Parent Company for the Competition Law Violation of Its Subsidiary 16: EU Law and Its Consideration of Retribution under the Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 17: A Problematic Mismatch between EU Jurisprudence on Parental Liability and Principle Legitimacy as 'Legality': The Restraining Impact of General Principles of EU Law on the Doctrine of Parental Liability 18: Parental Liability and the Principle of Ne Bis In Idem 19: The EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability and the Presumption of Innocence 20: Justifying in Principle the 100% Shareholding Presumption: An Alternative (Proportionality-Focused) Assessment Ensuring the Legitimacy of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability 21: A Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Parental Liability in EU Competition Law

I was very excited at the news of the publication of Professor Whelan's book, Parental Liability in EU Competition Law, and found in it, as I expected, the highest level of scholarly work.