Parental Liability in EU Competition Law

A Legitimacy-Focused Approach

Inbunden, Engelska, 2023

AvPeter Whelan,Leeds University) Whelan, Peter (Professor of Law, Professor of Law

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In enforcing EU competition law, the Commission employs a unique doctrine of parental antitrust liability: it imposes fines on the parent company of an infringing subsidiary in cases where the parent exercises decisive influence over the subsidiary's commercial policy. Critics of this contentious aspect of EU competition law believe that the doctrine is unfair, ineffective, obscure, disproportionate, contrary to due process, and based upon a dubious, if not extremely flimsy, justificatory foundation. Such criticism raises serious and unanswered questions about the legitimacy of the Commission's efforts to enforce competition law.Parental Liability in EU Competition Law: A Legitimacy-Focused Approach is the first monograph to be dedicated to this controversial topic. Written by Professor Peter Whelan, the book contends that, although the general concept of parental liability can be justified in principle, the current EU-level doctrine of parental antitrust liability in fact suffers from a distinct and problematic lack of legitimacy. More specifically, the said doctrine displays significant deficiencies with respect to effectiveness, fairness, and legality. Given this undesirable state of affairs, Parental Liability in EU Competition Law offers a fully-rationalised, reformulated approach to parental antitrust liability for EU competition law violations that is built around the notion of parental fault. That approach provides a solid normative account of how to impose parental antitrust liability in a manner that is theoretically robust, effective in practice, fair in substance, and legally sound.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2023-08-29
Mått184 x 257 x 37 mm
Vikt1 212 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor624
FörlagOUP OXFORD
ISBN9780198844839

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Professor Peter Whelan is a Professor of Law at the School of Law, University of Leeds, where he is the Director of the Centre for Business Law and Practice. He has a PhD in Law from St John's College, University of Cambridge, and is a qualified US Attorney-at-Law. His work on competition law has been cited in European, African and South American judgments. He is a Non-Governmental Advisor to the International Competition Network and is a member of the United Nations Working Group on Cross-Border Cartels. To date Peter has presented his research in over thirty countries, across six continents.

Context and Background1: EU-Level Parental Antitrust Liability and the Crucial Issue of Its Legitimacy2: Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust LiabilityThe Foundations of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability: 'Undertaking' and the Imputation Process3: 'Undertaking' and Its Legal Implications4: Determining the Constituent Elements of an Undertaking5: The Constituent Elements of an Undertaking to Which an Infringement Can Be ImputedThe EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability6: The Specifics of the Doctrine: Imputing the Competition Law Violation to the Parent Company7: The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Impact on the Imposition and Construction of Antitrust Fines8: The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Interaction with Other Enforcement Policies and DoctrinesLegitimacy as 'Justifiability': Rationalising the Existence of Parental Liability for EU Competition Law Violations9: Deterrence in EU Competition Law and Its Relevance to Parental Liability10: Employing Deterrence Theory to Justify Parental Liability for Competition Violations11: The Applicability to EU-Level Enforcement of the Deterrence-Based Justification for Parental LiabilityLegitimacy as 'Effectiveness': The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Specifics of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability12: The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Scope and Substance of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability13: The Deterrence-Based Rationale and the Specific Implications of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust LiabilityLegitimacy as 'Fairness': The Restraining Effect of Retribution on the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability14: Retribution and Its Relevance to the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability15: The Personal Responsibility of the Parent Company for the Competition Law Violation of Its Subsidiary16: EU Law and Its Consideration of Retribution under the Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability17: A Problematic Mismatch between EU Jurisprudence on Parental Liability and PrincipleLegitimacy as 'Legality': The Restraining Impact of General Principles of EU Law on the Doctrine of Parental Liability18: Parental Liability and the Principle of Ne Bis In Idem19: The EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability and the Presumption of Innocence20: Justifying in Principle the 100% Shareholding Presumption: An Alternative (Proportionality-Focused) AssessmentEnsuring the Legitimacy of the EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Antitrust Liability21: A Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Parental Liability in EU Competition Law