Moral Perception

Robert Audi is John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. His books include Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, Moral Value and Human Diversity, The Good in the Right (Princeton), and Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision.

• Preface vii Acknowledgments xi Introduction 1 PART ONE Perception and Moral Knowledge 5 Chapter 1 Perception: Sensory, Conceptual, and Cognitive Dimensions 7 * I. Major Kinds of Perception 8 * II. The Phenomenology and Content of Perception 12 * III. The Basis of Veridical Perception 21 Chapter 2 Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elements 30 * I. The Perception of Right and Wrong 30 * II. The Representational Character of Moral Perception 38 Chapter 3 Perception as a Direct Source of Moral Knowledge 51 * I. Perception and Inference 51 * II. Can Moral Perception Be Naturalized? 55 * III. Moral Perception as a Basis of Moral Knowledge 58 PART TWO Ethical Intuition, Emotional Sensibility, and Moral Judgment 67 Chapter 4 Perceptual Grounds, Ethical Disagreement, and Moral Intuitions 69 * I. Does Moral Disagreement Undermine Justification in Ethics? 70 * II. The Concept of an Intuition 83 * III. Intuitions as Apprehensions 96 Chapter 5 Moral Perception, Aesthetic Perception, and Intuitive Judgment 103 * I. The Role of Intuition in Aesthetic Experience 103 * II. Aesthetic and Moral Properties: Comparison and Contrast 106 * III. The Rule-Governed Element in Ethics and Aesthetics 109 * IV. The Reliability of Intuition 112 Chapter 6 Emotion and Intuition as Sources of Moral Judgment 121 * I. Emotion and Intuition: Interaction and Integration 122 * II. The Evidential Role of Emotion in Moral Matters 136 Chapter 7 The Place of Emotion and Moral Intuition in Normative Ethics 143 * I. Emotion and Moral Intuition 143 * II. Moral Imagination as a Nexus of Intuition, Emotion, and Perception 157 * III. Intuition and Moral Judgment 161 Conclusion 170 Index 175

"[T]his excellent book furthers Audi's recent attempts to develop a modest form of moral intuitionism."--Choice "At a minimum, Moral Perception has redefined the terms of the future of the moral perception debate through brilliant attention to clear distinctions and the various ways in which moral perception must account for neighboring phenomena in aesthetics and psychology. Throughout the chapters, you can just 'see' the virtues of Audi's arguments; although to figure out how this is possible, you must still read the book."--Kevin DeLapp, Social Theory and Practice "Thanks to the epistemological depth and the direct access to the major topics of the contemporary debate, this book enriches Audi's philosophy in a way that reasonably makes him one of the most influential moral philosophers of our time."--Simone Grigoletlo, Universa. Recensioni di Filosofia "[H]is book proves quite interesting as he explores how moral perception relates to intuition, aesthetic perception, and emotion... His analysis and discussion of how moral perception and intuition can be both rational yet non-inferential is a helpful and welcome addition to his already substantial work in epistemology."--James Taggart, Metapsychology Online Reviews "Audi's is the first book-length treatment of the topic, and is further distinguished by its placing the discussion of moral perception in the context of a comprehensive epistemology and philosophy of mind. It is a rich and thought-provoking work which will engage philosophers from a variety of areas."--Robert Cowan, Mind "Moral Perception contains a great deal that is of interest, and represents an important contribution to an ongoing debate."--Stephen Ingram, Journal of Moral Philosophy