Mental Causation

Inbunden, Engelska, 1993

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Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think.Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behaviour have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world.This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature.Contributors: Robert Audi, Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, H. W. Noonan, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Robert Van Gulick.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum1993-01-21
Mått163 x 223 x 26 mm
Vikt585 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor352
FörlagClarendon Press
ISBN9780198239291

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Part 1 Davidson, anomalous monism and mental caustion: thinking causes, Donald Audi; can supervenience and "non-strict laws" save anomalous monism?, Jaegwon Kim; Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenominalism, Brian P. McLaughlin; Davidson's thinking causes, Ernest Sosa. Part 2 Causation and explanation: mental causation - sustaining and dynamic, Robert Audi; metaphysics and mental causation, Lynne Rudder Baker; mind-body causation and explanatory practice, Tyler Burge; mental events such as structuring causes of behaviour, Fred Dretske; the union theory and anti-individualism, Ted Honderich; agency and causal explanation, Jennifer Hornsby; the non-reductive's troubles with mental causation, Jaegwon Kim; explanation in biopsychology, Ruth Garrett Millikan; who's in charge here?, and who's doing all the work?, Robert van Gulick. Part 3 Content: some content in narrow, Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit; object-dependent thoughts - a case of superficial necessity but deep contingency?, H.W. Noonan; abilities, concepts and externalism, Ernest Sosa.

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