Charles A. Holt is the A. Willis Robertson Professor of Political Economy and director of the Veconlab at the University of Virginia. A founding coeditor of the journal Experimental Economics and former president of the Economic Science Association, he is also a coauthor of the graduate textbook Experimental Economics (Princeton).

• Preface1 Introduction2 Price Discovery and ExclusionI INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS: RISK AVERSION, PROSPECT THEORY, AND LEARNING3 Risk and Decision Making4 Prospect Theory and Anomalies5 Bayes’ Rule6 Belief Elicitation and Ambiguity Aversion7 Individual and Social LearningII BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY8 Some Simple Games: Competition, Coordination, and Guessing9 Multi-Stage Games, Noisy Behavior10 Randomized Strategies11 Choice of Partners, Social Dilemmas12 Contests and Rent Seeking13 Methodology, Nonparametric TestsIII SOCIAL PREFERENCES14 Bargaining15 Trust, Reciprocity, and Principal-Agent Games16 Voluntary Contributions17 The Volunteer’s Dilemma18 Externalities, Congestion, and Common-Pool Resources19 Voting and Politics ExperimentsIV MARKET EXPERIMENTS20 Monopoly, Cournot, and Cross-Market Price Competition21 Market Power, Collusion, and Price Competition22 Supply Chains23 Adverse Selection in Lemons and Insurance Markets24 Asset Markets and Price Bubbles25 Bank Runs and Macro ExperimentsV AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGN26 Private Value Auctions27 The Winner’s Curse28 Multi-Unit Auctions: Emissions, Water, License Plates, Securities29 Combinatorial and Two-Sided Auctions30 Matching MechanismsAppendix 1: Hints for End-of-Chapter ProblemsReferencesAppendix 2: Instructions for Class ExperimentsIndex

“Charlie Holt has been at the very forefront in bringing experiments into the mainstream of economic research and, especially, in using experiments to teach economics. This book will give undergraduates or masters students a chance to learn from a pioneering experimenter and a master teacher.”—Alvin Roth, Stanford University

Charles A. Holt is the A. Willis Robertson Professor of Political Economy and director of the Veconlab at the University of Virginia. A founding coeditor of the journal Experimental Economics and former president of the Economic Science Association, he is also a coauthor of the graduate textbook Experimental Economics (Princeton).

• Preface1 Introduction2 Price Discovery and ExclusionI INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS: RISK AVERSION, PROSPECT THEORY, AND LEARNING3 Risk and Decision Making4 Prospect Theory and Anomalies5 Bayes’ Rule6 Belief Elicitation and Ambiguity Aversion7 Individual and Social LearningII BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY8 Some Simple Games: Competition, Coordination, and Guessing9 Multi-Stage Games, Noisy Behavior10 Randomized Strategies11 Choice of Partners, Social Dilemmas12 Contests and Rent Seeking13 Methodology, Nonparametric TestsIII SOCIAL PREFERENCES14 Bargaining15 Trust, Reciprocity, and Principal-Agent Games16 Voluntary Contributions17 The Volunteer’s Dilemma18 Externalities, Congestion, and Common-Pool Resources19 Voting and Politics ExperimentsIV MARKET EXPERIMENTS20 Monopoly, Cournot, and Cross-Market Price Competition21 Market Power, Collusion, and Price Competition22 Supply Chains23 Adverse Selection in Lemons and Insurance Markets24 Asset Markets and Price Bubbles25 Bank Runs and Macro ExperimentsV AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGN26 Private Value Auctions27 The Winner’s Curse28 Multi-Unit Auctions: Emissions, Water, License Plates, Securities29 Combinatorial and Two-Sided Auctions30 Matching MechanismsAppendix 1: Hints for End-of-Chapter ProblemsReferencesAppendix 2: Instructions for Class ExperimentsIndex

“Charlie Holt has been at the very forefront in bringing experiments into the mainstream of economic research and, especially, in using experiments to teach economics. This book will give undergraduates or masters students a chance to learn from a pioneering experimenter and a master teacher.”—Alvin Roth, Stanford University

Charles A. Holt is the A. Willis Robertson Professor of Political Economy and director of the Veconlab at the University of Virginia. A founding coeditor of the journal Experimental Economics and former president of the Economic Science Association, he is also a coauthor of the graduate textbook Experimental Economics (Princeton).

• Preface1 Introduction2 Price Discovery and ExclusionI INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS: RISK AVERSION, PROSPECT THEORY, AND LEARNING3 Risk and Decision Making4 Prospect Theory and Anomalies5 Bayes’ Rule6 Belief Elicitation and Ambiguity Aversion7 Individual and Social LearningII BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY8 Some Simple Games: Competition, Coordination, and Guessing9 Multi-Stage Games, Noisy Behavior10 Randomized Strategies11 Choice of Partners, Social Dilemmas12 Contests and Rent Seeking13 Methodology, Nonparametric TestsIII SOCIAL PREFERENCES14 Bargaining15 Trust, Reciprocity, and Principal-Agent Games16 Voluntary Contributions17 The Volunteer’s Dilemma18 Externalities, Congestion, and Common-Pool Resources19 Voting and Politics ExperimentsIV MARKET EXPERIMENTS20 Monopoly, Cournot, and Cross-Market Price Competition21 Market Power, Collusion, and Price Competition22 Supply Chains23 Adverse Selection in Lemons and Insurance Markets24 Asset Markets and Price Bubbles25 Bank Runs and Macro ExperimentsV AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGN26 Private Value Auctions27 The Winner’s Curse28 Multi-Unit Auctions: Emissions, Water, License Plates, Securities29 Combinatorial and Two-Sided Auctions30 Matching MechanismsAppendix 1: Hints for End-of-Chapter ProblemsReferencesAppendix 2: Instructions for Class ExperimentsIndex

“Charlie Holt has been at the very forefront in bringing experiments into the mainstream of economic research and, especially, in using experiments to teach economics. This book will give undergraduates or masters students a chance to learn from a pioneering experimenter and a master teacher.”—Alvin Roth, Stanford University