Lying and Deception

Thomas L. Carson is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. He is the author of two books, Value and the Good Life (University of Notre Dame Press) and The Status of Morality (D.Reidel), and is the co-editor of Morality and the Good Life (OUP) and Moral Relativism (OUP).

• Introduction and Precis ; PART I: CONCEPTS ; 1: LYING ; Introduction ; 1.1 MY DEFINITION OF LYING ; 1.I.1 Lies and Falsehoods ; 1.I.2 Falsehoods and Lies ; 1.I.3 A Reformulation of the Dictionary Definitions ; 1.I.4 Lying and the Right to Know the Truth ; 1.I.5 That the Intent to Deceive is not Necessary for Lying ; 1.I.6 Chisholm and Feehan's Definition ; 1.I.7 My Definition of Lying (A Preliminary Version) ; 1.I.8 "A Defence of the Transparency Thesis" ; 1.I.9 The Concept of Warranting ; 1.I.10 Conditions for Warranting the Truth of a Statement ; 1.I.11 Yet Another Revision ; 1.I.12 A Complication of My Final Definition ; 1.I.13 Some Comments on this Definition ; 1.I.14 An Objection: The Concept of Assertion ; Fried ; Williams ; Chisholm and Feehan ; 1.I.15 Reasons to Accept my Definition ; 1.II REPLIES TO CRITICISMS OF MY DEFINITION ; 1.II.1 Sorensen ; 1.II.2 Fallis ; Conclusions ; Endnotes ; 2. DECEPTION AND RELATED CONCEPTS ; Introduction ; 2.I DECEPTION ; 2.I.2 Several Objections and Modified Versions of My Definition ; 2.I.3 Some Considerations Relevant to Later Parts of the Book ; 2.II KEEPING SOMEONE IN THE DARK ; 2.III THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LYING, DECEPTION, KEEPING SOMEONE IN THE DARK, CONCEALING INFORMATION, AND WITHHOLDING INFORMATION ; 2.III.1 The Difference between Lying and Deception ; 2.III.2 Deception Versus Witholding Information ; 2.III.3 Concealing Information, Withholding Information, and Deception ; 2.IV TWO RELATED NOTIONS: "SPIN" AND "HALF-TRUTHS" ; 2.V BULLSHIT ; 2.V.1 Frankfurt on Bullshit, Deception, and Lying ; 2.V.2 Bullshit and Lack of Concern with the Truth ; 2.V.3 Bullshit Does Not Require the Intention to Deceive ; 2.V.4 Lying Can Constitute Producing Bullshit ; 2.V.5 Bullshitters Can be Concerned with the Truth of What they Say ; 2.VI A VERY BRIEF NOTE ON HONESTY ; Endnotes ; PART II: MORAL THEORY ; IIA NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY ; 3. KANT AND THE ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION AGAINST LYING ; Introduction ; 3.I KANT'S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE ; 3.I.1 The Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative ; 3.I.2 Perfect and Imperfect Duties ; 3.I.3 The Second and Third Versions of the Categorical Imperative ; 3.II WHAT KANT SAYS ABOUT THE MORALITY OF LYING ; 3.II.1 The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) ; 3.II.2 Metaphysics of Morals (1797) ; 3.II.3 "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Concerns" ; 3.II.4 Allan Wood's Alternative Reading of "On a Supposed Right..." ; 3.II.5 Lectures on Ethics ; 3.III DOES THE FIRST VERSION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IMPLY THAT LYING IS ALWAYS WRONG? ; 3.IV DOES THE SECOND VERSION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IMPLY THAT LYING IS ALWAYS WRONG? ; 3.V A ROSSIAN ARGUMENT FOR THINKING THAT LYING IS SOMETIMES MORALLY PERMISSABLE ; Conclusions ; Endnotes ; 4. ACT-UTILITARIANISM ; Introduction ; 4.I THE DEFINITION OF (ACT) UTILITARIANISM ; Act and Rule Utilitarianism/Consequentialism ; 4.II GUIDE TO ACTION VERSUS CRITERION OF RIGHT AND WRONG ; 4.III THE IMPLICATIONS OF ACT-UTILITARIANISM FOR ISSUES OF LYING AND DECEPTION ; Direct Bad Consequences of Lying and Deception ; Conclusions and Transition to Chapter 5 ; Endnotes ; 5. ROSS AND RULE-CONSEQUENTIALISM ; Introduction ; 5.I ROSS'S THEORY ; 5.I.1 The Concept of Prima Facie Duty ; 5.I.2 Ross's List of Prima Facie Duties ; 5.I.3 Applying Ross's Theory to Cases ; 5.I.4 How Strong is the Moral Presumption against Lying? ; 5.II ROSS'S CRITICISMS OF ACT-UTILITARIANISM ; 5.II.1 Ross and Utilitarianism on Promise Keeping ; 5.II.2 Ross's Arguments about Promise-Keeping Modified to Apply to Cases of Lying ; 5.III ROSS ON THE BASIS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF FUNDAMENTAL MORAL PRINCIPLES ; 5.III.1 Self-Evidence ; 5.III.2 The Data of Ethics ; 5.IV CRITICISMS OF ROSS'S VIEW ABOUT THE BASIS OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE ; 5.IV.1 Self-Evident Knowledge ; 5.IV.2 The Moral Convictions of Thoughtful and Well-Educated People ; 5.IV.3 A Possible Reply for Ross ; 5.IV.4 Two Other Possible Lines for Ross to Take ; 5.V HOOKER'S RULE-CONSEQUENTIALISM ; 5.V.1 Hooker's Theory ; 5.V.2 Hooker's Arguments for Rule Consequentialism ; 5.V.3 Problems with Hooker's Arguments ; 5.VI CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTERS 3-5 AND TRANSITION TO CHAPTER 6 ; Endnotes ; IIB MORAL REASONING ; 6. THE GOLDEN RULE AND A THEORY OF MORAL REASONING ; Introduction ; 6.I RATIONALITY CONDITIONS FOR MORAL JUDGEMENTS AND MORAL JUDGES ; 6.I.1 Consistency ; 6.I.2 Being Adequately Informed ; 6.I.3 Proper Cognitive Functioning ; 6.II THE GOLDEN RULE ; 6.II.1 Proof of the Golden Rule ; 6.II.2 Defense of Premises 1, 1a, 1b, and 1c ; 6.II.3 Defense of Premises 2, 2a, 2b, and 2c ; 6.III THE FORCE OF GOLDEN RULE ARGUMENTS ; An Example ; 6.IV OBJECTIONS TO THE GOLDEN RULE ; 6.IV.1 When are Differences Morally Relevant? ; 6.IV.2 Masochists and People with Unusual Preferences ; 6.IV.3 Punishing People and Doing Things that they Do Not Want One to Do ; 6.IV.4 People who are Depressed and Do Not Care what Happens to them ; 6.V APPLICATIONS: RATIONAL CONSISTENT MORAL JUDGES WILL ALL AGREE IN THEIR JUDGEMENTS ABOUT CERTAIN ISSUES ; 6.V.1 Nazis ; 6.V.2 Fraud ; 6.V.3 Another Case of Fraud ; 6.V.4 Ethical Egoism ; 6.VI WHY BE CONSISTENT? ; Question 1 ; Question 2 ; An Objection ; 6.VII MORAL NIHILISM/AMORALISM (OPTING OUT OF MORAL DISCOURSE) ; 6.VII.1 Consistency Arguments Only Apply to People Who Make Moral Judgements ; 6.VII.2 Reasons to Accept Morality ; 6.VII.3 A Reservation ; 6.VIII A NOTE ON R. M. HARE ; 6.IX LIMITATIONS/CAVEATS ; Endnotes ; IIC THE IMPLICATIONS OF IIA AND IIB FOR QUESTIONS ABOUT LYING AND DECEPTION ; 7. THE PARTIAL OVERLAP/CONVERGENCE OF REASONABLE VIEWS ; Introduction ; 7.I WHAT RATIONALITY/CONSISTENCY TESTS CAN AND CANNOT SHOW ; An Objection ; 7.II ABSOLUTISM ; 7.III REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM ; 7.IV THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE RESULTS FOR THE REST OF THE BOOK ; Endnotes ; PART III: APPLICATIONS ; 8. DECEPTION AND WITHHOLDING INFORMATION ON SALES ; Introduction ; Caveat Emptor ; 8.I THE OBLIGATIONS OF SALESPEOPLE ; 8.I.1 My View ; 8.I.2 A Justification for My View ; A Qualification ; An Objection ; Reply ; The Justification of Duties 5 and 6 ; 8.II CASE STUDIES ; 8.II.1 Deception in Sales ; Case 1: The Sales Tactics of the Holland Furnace Company ; Case 2: Falsifying an Odometer ; Case 3: College Admissions ; Case 4: Shoe Sales ; What about Cases in Which a Person Benefits by Being Deceived? ; Case 5: Paternalistic Deception ; 8.II.2 WithHolding Information in Sales ; Case 1: Health Insurance ; Case 2: Steering Customers ; Case 3: Withholding Information about Defects ; Endnotes ; 9. DECEPTION IN ADVERTISING ; Introduction ; 9.I DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING ; 9.I.1 The Harmfulness of Deceptive Advertising: Case Studies ; Sears Dishwasher ; Listerine ; Vioxx ; R. J. Reynolds ; 9.I.2 The Wrongness of Deceptive Advertising ; 9.II WHY FOLLOWING THE LAW IS NOT ENOUGH ; 9.II.1 The FTC's Definition of Deceptive Advertising ; 9.II.2 Why it's not Enough to Follow the Law ; 9.III TWO OBJECTIONS ; 9.III.1 Cases of Small Harms to Many People ; 9.III.2 What if Being Honest gives Dishonest Competitors an Advantage? ; Endnotes ; 10. BLUFFING AND DECEPTION IN NEGOTIATIONS ; Introduction ; 10.I WHAT IS BLUFFING? ; 10.II THE ECONOMICS OF BLUFFING ; 10.III IS IT MORALLY PERMISSIBLE TO MISSTATE ONE'S NEGOTIATING POSITION? ; An Objection ; 10.IV APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENSE ; An Objection ; Replies ; A Related Objection ; Endnotes ; 11. HONESTY, PROFESSIONALS, AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ; Introduction ; 11.I THE FREQUENT INCENTIVE/TEMPTATION TO DECEIVE CLIENTS ; 11.II INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS ; 11.III INFORMED CONSENT ; Exceptions ; Endnotes ; 12. LYING AND DECEPTION ABOUT QUESTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE: CASE STUDIES ; Introduction ; 12.I LYING AND DECEPTION IN ORDER TO CREATE A JUSTIFICATION OR PRETEXT FOR WAR ; 12.I.1 Hearst and the Spanish American War ; 12.I.2 Franklin Roosevelt and World War II ; 12.I.3 Lyndon Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution ; 12.II ANOTHER CASE: GEORGE W. BUSH, DICK CHENEY, AND THE IRAQ WAR OF 2003 ; 12.II.1 Claims About Iraq's "Weapons of Mass-Destruction" ; 12.II.2 Claims About the Connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda ; 12.II.3 The Falsity of Claims about Iraq's Weapons and its Connections with Al Qaeda ; 12.II.4 Reasons to Think that Some of the Claims about Iraq's Weapons and Ties to Al Qaeda Constituted Lying or (Attempted) Deception ; 12.II.5 Lying and Deception about Other Matters Related to the Iraq War ; 12.III A CASE OF LYING/DECEPTION TO AVOID WAR? ; 12.IV A MORAL ASSESSMENT OF (SOME OF) THE CASES ; 12.IV.1 Lyndon Johnson ; 12.IV.2 Bush and Cheney ; 12.IV.3 Over-optimism as a Major Cause of Wars ; 12.IV.4 Franklin Roosevelt ; 12.IV.5 Acheson, Dulles, and Eisenhower ; Endnotes ; 13. HONESTY, CONFLICTS, AND THE TELLING OF HISTORY: MORE CASE STUDIES ; Introduction ; 13.I GERMANY, WORLD WAR I, AND THE MYTH OF THE "STAB IN THE BACK" ; American Versions of the Dolchstosslegenge? ; 13.II REWRITING HISTORY ; 13.II.1 Feel-Good Confederate History and the Post-Civil War South ; 13.II.2 Lying About the Crimes of Joseph Stalin ; 13.II.3 An Objection ; 13.III HALF-TRUTHS AND GROUP CONFLICT ; 13.III.1 Half-Truths ; 13.III.2 Examples of Harmful Half-Truths ; The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ; The US and Iran ; Hitler and Germany's Suffering after WWI ; 13.III.3 Half-Truths in Personal Relations ; 13.IV INTELLECTUAL HONESTY ; Endnotes ; 14. HONESTY AS A VIRTUE ; Introduction ; 14.I DISSENTERS FROM CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ; 14.I.1 Lying, Deception, and Privacy ; 14.I.2 Lying, Honesty, and Interpersonal Conflicts ; 14.I.3 Lying, Deception, and Self-Esteem ; 14.II IN WHAT SENSE HONESTY IS AND IS NOT A VIRTUE ; Endnotes ; Bibliography ; Index

I think that Carson'sanalysis comes very close to capturing the normative element of lying ... Carson has produced an excellent work that combines conceptual analysis, moral theory, and applied philosophy. Anyone interested in lying and deception from any of these philosophical perspectives should read this book. Moreover, Carson is right to emphasize the conceptual and moral importance of warranting the truth of what you do not believe.