Locke on Personal Identity

Consciousness and Concernment

Inbunden, Engelska, 2011

AvGalen Strawson

599 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar. Fri frakt för medlemmar vid köp för minst 249 kr.

Finns i fler format (1)

Häftad

379 kr

Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves - yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In his new book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word "person" only in the ordinary way, as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. In these terms, your personal identity is roughly a matter of those of your past actions that you are still responsible for because you are still "conscious" of them in Locke's special sense of that word. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2011-10-09
Mått140 x 216 x 24 mm
Vikt454 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SeriePrinceton Monographs in Philosophy
Antal sidor280
FörlagPrinceton University Press
ISBN9780691147574

Tillhör följande kategorier

Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Preface xi Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2 : "Person" 5 Chapter 3: "Person ... is a forensic term" 17 Chapter 4: Concernment 22 Chapter 5: Consciousness 30 Chapter 6:"Consciousness ... is inseparable from thinking" 42 Chapter 7 : "From the inside" 50 Chapter 8 : "Person" Locke's Definition 58 Chapter 9 : Consciousness Is Not Memory 72 Chapter 10 : Personal Identity 77 Chapter 11 : Psychological Connectedness 88 Chapter 12 : Transition (Butler Dismissed) 93 Chapter 13 : "But next ... ": Personal Identity without Substantial Continuity 97 Chapter 14 : "And therefore ... ": [I]-transfers, [Ag]-transfers, [P]-transfers 110 Chapter 15 : "A fatal error of theirs" 119 Chapter 16 : A Fatal Error of Locke's? 125 Chapter 17 : Circularity? 131 Chapter 18 : The Distinction between [P] and [S] 135 Chapter 19 : Concernment and Repentance 139 Chapter 20 : Conclusion 150 Postface 157 Appendix 1 : "Of Identity and Diversity" by John Locke 163 Appendix 2 : A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion Concerning Personal Identity by Edmund Law 233 References 253 Index 257