Edited by Donald P. Racheter, Executive Director, Public Interest Institute and Richard E. Wagner, Emeritus Professor of Economics, George Mason University, US

• Contents: Preface 1. Faustian Bargains and Constitutional Governance Part I: Why Should Government be Limited? 2. The Purpose and Limits of Government 3. Constitutionally-Limited Government versus Popular Democracy 4. Government: An Expensive Provider Part II: Which Limits on Government are Appropriate? 5. Constitutional Limits Versus Statutory Rules 6. Constitutional Spending Limitations and the Optimal Size of Government 7. Tax Limits 8. Regulatory Limits 9. The Case for Congressional Term Limits is the Same as the Case for Pollution Control 10. Electoral Limits Part III: Are Auxiliary Precautions Needed? 11. Federalist Theory and Polycentricity: Learning from Local Governments 12. Searching for Order: The Costly Interaction of Formal and Informal Systems 13. Technological and Economic Limitations on Governments Index

'The book is an excellent introduction to the various tools and reasons for limiting government. . . . this book is first-rate. The summaries and overviews are unusually well done, and the book would work well as a reader or a second text in a variety of courses. It is intended as an introduction and overview, and it succeeds admirably.'

Edited by Donald P. Racheter, Executive Director, Public Interest Institute and Richard E. Wagner, Emeritus Professor of Economics, George Mason University, US

• Contents: Preface 1. Faustian Bargains and Constitutional Governance Part I: Why Should Government be Limited? 2. The Purpose and Limits of Government 3. Constitutionally-Limited Government versus Popular Democracy 4. Government: An Expensive Provider Part II: Which Limits on Government are Appropriate? 5. Constitutional Limits Versus Statutory Rules 6. Constitutional Spending Limitations and the Optimal Size of Government 7. Tax Limits 8. Regulatory Limits 9. The Case for Congressional Term Limits is the Same as the Case for Pollution Control 10. Electoral Limits Part III: Are Auxiliary Precautions Needed? 11. Federalist Theory and Polycentricity: Learning from Local Governments 12. Searching for Order: The Costly Interaction of Formal and Informal Systems 13. Technological and Economic Limitations on Governments Index

'The book is an excellent introduction to the various tools and reasons for limiting government. . . . this book is first-rate. The summaries and overviews are unusually well done, and the book would work well as a reader or a second text in a variety of courses. It is intended as an introduction and overview, and it succeeds admirably.'

Edited by Donald P. Racheter, Executive Director, Public Interest Institute and Richard E. Wagner, Emeritus Professor of Economics, George Mason University, US

• Contents: Preface 1. Faustian Bargains and Constitutional Governance Part I: Why Should Government be Limited? 2. The Purpose and Limits of Government 3. Constitutionally-Limited Government versus Popular Democracy 4. Government: An Expensive Provider Part II: Which Limits on Government are Appropriate? 5. Constitutional Limits Versus Statutory Rules 6. Constitutional Spending Limitations and the Optimal Size of Government 7. Tax Limits 8. Regulatory Limits 9. The Case for Congressional Term Limits is the Same as the Case for Pollution Control 10. Electoral Limits Part III: Are Auxiliary Precautions Needed? 11. Federalist Theory and Polycentricity: Learning from Local Governments 12. Searching for Order: The Costly Interaction of Formal and Informal Systems 13. Technological and Economic Limitations on Governments Index

'The book is an excellent introduction to the various tools and reasons for limiting government. . . . this book is first-rate. The summaries and overviews are unusually well done, and the book would work well as a reader or a second text in a variety of courses. It is intended as an introduction and overview, and it succeeds admirably.'