Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance

Svetozar Pejovich, Professor Emeritus, Texas A&M University, US, Honorary Doctorate, University of Belgrade, Serbia and Professor of Law and Economics, University of Donja Gorica, Montenegro; with contributions from Enrico Colombatto, Professor of Economics, School of Economics, University of Turin, Italy

• Contents:Foreword by Leonard P. LiggioPreface and AcknowledgmentsPART I: BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS1. The Game and the Rules of the Game2. Transaction Costs PART II: TRANSFORMATION OF THE MEDIEVAL COMMUNITY INTO MODERN SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, THE RULE OF LAW AND CAPITALISM 3. From the Middle Ages to Capitalism4. Capitalism and the Rule of LawAppendix: Afraid to be Free: Dependency as DesideraturmJames M. Buchanan5. The Law of Contract and the Judiciary6. The Economic Functions of the Constitution7. Private Property Rights8. Capitalism, Economic Freedom and Performance9. The Rule of Law and Capitalism: An OverviewPART III: TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE10. The Method of Analysis11. The Interaction Thesis12. The Carriers of Change: The Role of Entrepreneurs 13. Formal Institutions14. Informal Institutions or Cultural Traditions: The Role of Pathfinders15. Efficiency-Friendly Institutional Change within the Structure of TraditionIndex

'Almost everyone will gain something of value from reading this book. For those who work in the new institutional economics, Pejovich provides a thoughtful treatment of how common-law and civil-law systems affect personal freedoms and rule of law. The book's larger market, however, will comprise educated lay readers, who will gain a deeper appreciation of the foundations of capitalism in the developed world and of the dynamics of interrelated institutional and economic change.'