Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science

Jody Azzouni is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. He is the author of Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice: The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences.

• General introduction Part I Procedural foundationalism 1 Introduction to Part I 2 Program and scope 3 Reductionism, confirmation holism, theoretical deductivism 4 Some observations on reductionism and the "autonomy" of the special sciences 5 Some comments on the philosophical implications of the use of idealizations in science 6 Gross regularities 7 Procedures and perceptual procedures 8 Shedding perceptual procedures 9 Conclusion to Part I Part II Two-tiered coherentism 1 Introduction to Part II 2 Evidential centrality 3 Ob-similar extensions and ob*-similar extensions 4 Ob-similarity, observational regularities, reasons for incommensurability 5 Kuhnian considerations and the accumulation of knowledge 6 Perceptual impermeability and biotechnical incommensurability 7 Methodological observations about epistemology, scepticism and truth Part III Permuting reference 1 Introduction to Part III 2 Formal considerations 3 Quine’s version 4 Field’s version 5 Putnam’s version 6 The ontological status of causality 7 Some puzzles about reference 8 Conclusion to Part III Part IV The transcendence of reference 1 Introduction to Part IV 2 Troubles for naive naturalism 3 The elusivity of reference 4 Causality and reference: an analysis 5 Transcending procedures 6 Transcendence and its discontents

"This work is like a breath of fresh air. It is a very original, cogently argued study of the differences between what we do and what we say, as that difference bears on crucial isues in the philosophy of science, mathematics, language, as well as epistemology and metaphysics. The unity of view that is achieved across these philosophical areas is truly impressive." - Arnold Koslow, CUNY, USA