This book is a philosophical investigation of Kierkegaard’s approach to truth and subjectivity in relation to Chinese Chan Buddhist thought represented by Huineng (638–713). A problem that seems to surface for the close reader with some familiarity with both thinkers is whether Kierkegaard’s “Truth Is Subjectivity” is indeed the same as Huineng’s “Dharma (truth or Buddha-law) Is Nonduality 佛法不二,” as lacking a subject and object distinction between the knower and what is to know (the referent). Adopting a comparative method based on the Conceptual Metaphor Theory in cognitive linguistics, this volume embraces an investigation that is in effect an argument favoring a similarity between truth as subjectivity and dharma as nonduality. Through the lens of Huineng, Kierkegaard’s truth as subjectivity is of how I (i.e., the knowing subject) live truthfully without attachment. Its core concern is to emphasize how a person relates oneself to the truth by inwardly achieving self-understanding through actively being involved in one’s daily life rather than being attached to objective things or abstract ideas. By borrowing terms or categories such as “nonduality” from Chan’s philosophical discourses, this research implies that Chinese Chan offers the resources for a contemporary inquiry into the relevant issue in Kierkegaard’s thought. This book appeals to students and researchers. It contributes to work within interreligious dialogue and comparative philosophy or theology, deepening the dialogue between the two faith traditions or cultures.