Kit Fine on Truthmakers, Relevance, and Non-classical Logic

Federico L.G. Faroldi is associate professor of philosophy, law and artificial intelligence at the University of Pavia, Italy. He was previously Senior Researcher in Bern (Switzerland), where he directed an Ambizione project (SNSF), Senior Researcher of the Flanders Research Foundation (FWO) at Ghent University (Belgium) and Lise Meitner Fellow of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in Austria. He has studied or worked in Pisa, Florence, St Andrews, Oxford, ENS Rue d’Ulm (Paris), New York University, University of Southern California and Berkeley. His main interests are deontic logic, hyperintensionality, formal ethics, and the philosophy of AI. His most recent book is Hyperintensionality and Normativity (Springer).Frederik Van De Putte is assistant professor in philosophy at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam (Netherlands). He was previously a Marie Curie fellow at the University of Bayreuth (Germany) and a postdoctoral researcher of the Flanders Research Foundation(FWO) at Ghent University. He has published in major journals in analytic (formal) philosophy, on a variety of subjects in logic, formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and formal ethics. He serves as editor for Erkenntnis, an International Journal of Scientific Philosophy and was guest editor for several journal issues.

• Chapter 1. Introduction (Federico L.G. Faroldi and Frederik Van De Putte).- Chapter 2. Short autobiography (Kit Fine).- Chapter 3. Modern faces of filtration (Johan van Benthem and Nick Bezhanishvili).- Chapter 4. Reflections on filtration: A response to ‘modern faces of filtration’ by Johan van Benthem and Nick Bezhanishvili (Kit Fine).- Chapter 5. From felicitous models to answer set programming (Vladimir Lifschitz).- Chapter 6. Selective programming: Response to ‘From felicitous models to answer set programming’ by Vladimir Lifschitz (Kit Fine).- Chapter 7. Fine’s semantics for relevance logic and its relevance (Katalin Bimbó and Michael Dunn).- Chapter 8.Truthmaker semantics for relevance logic: Response to ‘Fine’s semantics for relevance logic and its relevance’ by Katalin Bimbó and J. Michael Dunn (Kit Fine).- Chapter 9. Conjunctive and disjunctive parts (Mark Jago).- Chapter 10. To be or not to be disjunctive: Response to Mark Jago’s ‘conjunctive and disjunctive parts’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 11. Truth-maker semantics for substructural logics (Ondrej Majer, Igor Sedlár and Vít Punćochář).- Chapter 12. Forms of conditionality: Response to ‘truth-maker semantics for some substructural logics’ by Ondrej Majer, , Igor Sedlár and Vít Punćochář.- Chapter 13. A strictly exact truthmaker semantics for non-transitive relevance and classical logic (Peter Verdée).- Chapter 14. The ghost of impossibility: Response to Peter Verdée’s ‘truthmakers and relevance for FDE, LP, K3 and CL’.- Chapter 15. Truthmaker semantics for epistemic logic (Peter Hawke and Aybuke Ozgun).- Chapter 16. An epistemized truthmaker semantics for epistemic logic: Response to Hawke’s and Ozgun’s ‘truthmaker semantics for epistemic logic’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 17. Counterfactuals, infinity and paradox (Andrew Bacon).- Chapter 18. Defense of a truthmaker approach to counterfactuals: Response to Andrew Bacon’s ‘counterfactuals, infinity and paradox’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 19. On the notion of aboutness in logical semantics (Alessandro Giordani).- Chapter 20. Situational and informational aboutness: Response to Giordani’s ‘on the notion of aboutness in logical semantics’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 21. Propositional potentialism (Peter Fritz).- Chapter 22. ‘The postulation of possibilities’: Response to Peter Fritz’s ‘propositional potentialism’ (Kit Fine).- Chater 23. The whole truth (Stephan Krämer).- Chapter 24. The whole truth: An internal perspective: Response to Krämer’s ‘the whole truth’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 25. New semantic framework for the logic of worldly grounding (and beyond) (Fabrice Correia).- Chapter 26. The algebraic and structural approaches to truthmaker semantics: Response to Fabrice Correia’s ‘a new semantic framework for the logic of worldly grounding (and beyond)’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 27. Permissive updates (Stephen Yablo and Daniel Rothschild).- Chapter 28. Truthmaker foundations for deontic logic: Response to Rothchild’s and Yablo’s ‘permissive updates’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 29. Comparing Russell and Fine on variable objects (Leon Horsten and Ryo Ito).- Chapter 30. Refining Russell: Response to Leon Horsten’s and Ryo Ito’s ‘Russell and Fine on variable objects’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 31. Fine on the possibility of vagueness (Andreas Ditter).- Chapter 32. In defense of a global view of vagueness: Response to Andreas Ditter’s ‘Fine on the possibility of vagueness’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 33. Progressive logic (Kit Fine and Errol Martin).