Kant's Struggle for Autonomy

Raef Zreik is associate professor of jurisprudence at Ono Academic College.

• IntroductionAbbreviationsPart 1: Kant’s Strategy of RetreatChapter 1: Autonomy in Kant’s Critique of Pure ReasonChapter 2: The Autonomy of MoralityChapter 3: The Autonomy of Justice (Law)Chapter 4: The Autonomy of Public Order (Legitimacy): Kant on RevolutionPart 2: Critique of Kant's Strategy of RetreatChapter 5: The Autonomy of Public Order (Legitimacy) RevisitedChapter 6: The Autonomy of Justice (Law) RevisitedChapter 7: The Autonomy of Morality RevisitedPart 3: Beyond Kant. Engagements with Current DebatesChapter 8: Wood and Willaschek: Between Law and Morality Again Chapter 9: Korsgaard on Lexical Priority, Rigorism, and the Double-level TheoryChapter 10: Herman and the Sensitivity to the ParticularConclusion

Raef Zreik shows that Kant’s use of the concept of autonomy as the underlying principle of both theoretical and practical philosophy has to be distinguished from the idea of autonomous domains of virtue, happiness, and law within practical philosophy. He argues carefully and convincingly that the idea of autonomy is crucial to Kant’s approach to each of these domains but that to think of them as completely separate from each other is a mistake that undermines the unity of Kant’s own philosophy and a coherent approach to practical philosophy in general. This is the most extensive and thorough interpretation and critique of Kant’s use of the concept of autonomy that I know.