David Christensen is Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He has written on skepticism, confirmation theory, and formal epistemology. More recently, his work concentrates on the epistemology of disagreement, and, more generally, on the relationship between what a subject is rational to believe about themselves, and what they're rational to believe about things in general.

• Chapter I: Self-Awareness and Higher-Order Evidence Chapter II: Self-Assessment: Rationality vs. Accuracy Chapter III: Judging One's Own Case: Independence Requirements Chapter IV: Modeling Rational Belief for Self-Aware Subjects Chapter V: Assessing the Model, and Principle for Self-Aware Believing Chapter VI: Self-Aware Believing and Epistemic Dilemmas Chapter VII: Self-Aware Believing and Epistemic Akrasia Chapter VIII: Self-Aware Believing and Self-Undermining Accounts of Rational Belief Chapter IX: Self-Aware Believing and Skepticism About Philosophy

David Christensen is Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He has written on skepticism, confirmation theory, and formal epistemology. More recently, his work concentrates on the epistemology of disagreement, and, more generally, on the relationship between what a subject is rational to believe about themselves, and what they're rational to believe about things in general.

• Chapter I: Self-Awareness and Higher-Order Evidence Chapter II: Self-Assessment: Rationality vs. Accuracy Chapter III: Judging One's Own Case: Independence Requirements Chapter IV: Modeling Rational Belief for Self-Aware Subjects Chapter V: Assessing the Model, and Principle for Self-Aware Believing Chapter VI: Self-Aware Believing and Epistemic Dilemmas Chapter VII: Self-Aware Believing and Epistemic Akrasia Chapter VIII: Self-Aware Believing and Self-Undermining Accounts of Rational Belief Chapter IX: Self-Aware Believing and Skepticism About Philosophy

David Christensen is Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He has written on skepticism, confirmation theory, and formal epistemology. More recently, his work concentrates on the epistemology of disagreement, and, more generally, on the relationship between what a subject is rational to believe about themselves, and what they're rational to believe about things in general.

• Chapter I: Self-Awareness and Higher-Order Evidence Chapter II: Self-Assessment: Rationality vs. Accuracy Chapter III: Judging One's Own Case: Independence Requirements Chapter IV: Modeling Rational Belief for Self-Aware Subjects Chapter V: Assessing the Model, and Principle for Self-Aware Believing Chapter VI: Self-Aware Believing and Epistemic Dilemmas Chapter VII: Self-Aware Believing and Epistemic Akrasia Chapter VIII: Self-Aware Believing and Self-Undermining Accounts of Rational Belief Chapter IX: Self-Aware Believing and Skepticism About Philosophy