Judges and the Making of International Criminal Law

Joseph Powderly, Ph.D. (2017, NUI, Galway), is Associate Professor of Public International Law at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University. His research focusses broadly on issues relevant to international criminal law, international human rights law, and cultural heritage law.

• ForewordAcknowledgementsList of Figures and TablesAbbreviationsTable of CasesTable of InstrumentsIntroductionI The International Judicial Function and the “Noble Lie”II Definitions: Judicial Creativity, Progressive Development of the Law, Disciplining Rules and LegitimacyIII Outline of the Bookpart 1The Profile, Ethics and Function of International Criminal Judges1 Getting to Know the International Criminal Judiciary: A Profile PortraitI IntroductionII A Portrait of the International Criminal Bench: Composition, Representation and Professional Background2.1 Geographic Representation2.2 Representation of Legal Systems2.3 Gender Representation2.4 Professional BackgroundIII Conclusion: Composing the PortraitThe Independence and Impartiality of the International Criminal JudiciaryI IntroductionII Independence, Impartiality and Related Issues of Ethical Judicial ConductIII Questioning Independence and Impartiality: Excusal and Disqualification of International Criminal Judges3.1 The Ethical Duty to Request Recusal3.2 Grounds for Disqualification: Conflicts of Interest, Personal Associations, or Past and Present Extrajudicial Functions3.2.1 Appointment to Political Office and the Maintenance of Judicial Independence: The Case of Judge Odio Benito3.2.2 Previous and Ongoing Involvement with Non-Governmental and Inter- Governmental Organizations: Judge Mumba and the Application of the Reasonable Observer Test3.2.3 Judge Ozaki’s Ambassadorship to Estonia: A Cautionary Tale3.3 Grounds for Disqualification: Biased Expressions of Opinion3.3.1 Opinions Expressed in Previous or Related Cases3.3.1.1‘The Antonetti Saga’3.3.1.1(A) ECtHR Jurisprudence on Judicial Impartiality3.3.1.1(B) “To Hell with Precedent”: The Birth of ‘The Antonetti Test’ in Mladic3.3.1.1(c) Meron v Antonetti in the Karadžic Case: A Petty but very Public Power Struggle3.3.2 Opinions Expressed Prior to Appointment to the Bench3.3.3 Extrajudicial Public Statements: The Perils of Free Speech3.3.3.1 Judge Harhoff’s Unburdening3.3.3.2 The (Un)Silencing of Judge SowIV ConclusionJudicial Creativity and the International Judicial Function: Lauterpacht’s LegacyI Introduction1.1 Why Lauterpacht?II Exploring Competing Conceptions of the Judicial Function: Beyond a Myopic Formalist AccountIII Identifying a Creative Interpretative Element in Conceptions of the International Judicial Function: Lauterpacht’s Legacy?3.1 Lauterpacht’s Theory of International Law3.2 Lauterpacht’s Conception of the International Judicial Function: Interpretative Creativity as the Pathway to Progress3.2.1 Judicial Creativity, Stare Decisis and the Evolution of the ‘Imperfect’ International Legal Order3.2.2 Gap-Filling, Pragmatism and the Gradual Concretization of Rules3.2.3 Effectiveness of Rules, Exhaustive Reasoning, and the Developmental Potential of Separate and Dissenting OpinionsIV Conclusions: Lauterpacht’s Legacypart 2Judicial Creativity and the Making of International Criminal Law4 Giving Life to International Criminal Justice: The Judicial Role in the Evolution of International Criminal ProcedureI IntroductionII The Function of International Criminal Procedure: Truth, Due Process and Efficiency2.1 Truth2.2 Due Process2.3 EfficiencyIII The Judicial Role in the Evolution of International Criminal Procedure3.1 Nuremberg and the Birth of the Rule- Making Power of the International Criminal Bench3.2 The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Judicial Role in the Development of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence/>3.3 Limiting the Judicial Role in the Development of International Criminal Procedure: The icc and the Reconfiguration of Procedural Rule-Making PowersIV Conclusion5 The Ad Hoc Tribunals, Judicial Creativity and the Rebirth of International Criminal LawI IntroductionII The Drafting of the Statutes, Sources of Law and the Secretary-General’s Inconsistent Interpretative GuidanceIII Methods of Interpretation: Piecemeal Identification and Fractured Application3.1 A Sound Interpretational Foundation: The vclt Rules3.2 Grounding Creative Judicial Interpretation: The Utilization of Articles 31 and 32 of the vcltIV Reliance on Customary International Law: A Cure for All Statutory Ailments?4.1 Identifying Rules of Customary International Law: The Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Chequered History/>4.1.1 The Tadic Jurisdiction Decision: Reshaping International Humanitarian Law under the Guise of Questionable Customary Rules/>4.1.2 Creating Custom in the Service of Humanity: Kupreškic, Reprisals and the Martens Clause/>4.1.3 Custom, Cassese and Judicial Entrepreneurialism/>V Precedent, Custom and Controversy: Defining the Limits of Modes of Liability5.1 From Tadic to the eccc: The Birth (and Possible Death) of jce iii within Customary International Law5.2 Perišic and the Tangled Jurisprudence on Specific DirectionVI The Importance of Exhaustive Reasoning for the Acceptance and Authority of Judicial Decisions6.1 The Consequences of a Failure of Exhaustive Reasoning: The Gotovina and Markac CaseVII Conclusion6 ‘Curb Your Creativity’: The Rome Statute and the Attempted Institution of Interpretative RestraintI IntroductionII The Rome Statute and the Codification of Interpretative RestraintIII Hierarchies, Sources and Strict Construction: Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Rome Statute3.1 Article 21(1) and 21(2): The Chaperoning of the Judicial Function and the Prioritization of Textual Interpretation3.1.1 The Interpretation of Article 25(3)(a): The Betrayal of Textualism3.1.2 Charting the Origins of Article 21’s Hierarchy of Sources and the Potential Impact on the Interpretative Judicial Function3.2 The Role of Precedent, Customary International Law and General Principles of Law in the Rome Statute’s Interpretative Regime3.2.1 Keeping Things in House: Adherence to Internal Precedent3.2.2 The Role of External Precedent in the Identification of “Principles and Rules of International Law”3.2.3 Questionable Rules of Customary International Law: The Rome Statute and Head of State Immunity3.2.4 General Principles Derived from National Systems as a Subsidiary Source3.3 Article 21(3): Consistency with International Human Rights Law as a General Interpretative Provision3.4 Article 22(2): Interpretative Freedom and the Requirements of Strict ConstructionIV ConclusionConclusionsI Dispensing with the “Noble Lie”II Lauterpacht’s Legacy and the International Criminal Judicial FunctionIII What Is Expected of the International Criminal Judge? Profile and Ethics of the International Criminal BenchIV The Judicial Role in the Progressive Development of International Criminal Law: Findings on Method and Future ProspectsV Parting WordsBibliographyIndex