Richard E. Wagner is Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University, USA. He is Senior Fellow of the Academic Advisory Board at the Independent Institute, the James Madison Institute for Public Policy Studies and the Virginia Institute for Public Policy. He was co-editor of the scholarly journal Constitutional Political Economy from 1989-1997, and he is currently a member of the editorial boards of Constitutional Political Economy, the Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, and the Review of Austrian Economics. He was one of Buchanan’s dissertation students, a co-author with Buchanan, and a faculty colleague for some 25 years.

• 1. Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why is He Significant?- Richard E. Wagner.- Part I:  Subjectivism and the Methodology of Political Economy.- 2. East Anglia, What Should Economists Do Now?- Robert Sugden.- 3. Duke, Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan- Michael Munger.- 4. Brown, James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist- Peter J. Boettke, George Mason and Rosolino Candela.- 5. James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Program- Stefan Kolev.- 6. George Mason, Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy- Abigail N. Devereaux, George Mason and Richard E. Wagner.- Part II: Public Finance and the Theory of the State.- 7. The Conflict between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods- Lawrence H. White.- 8. Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments- Charles Beat Blankart and David Ehmke.- 9. The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments- David Hebert.- 10. Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a mostly Private Good- Mark V. Pauly.- 11. Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand- Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones.- 12. The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons- Christopher J. Coyne and Thomas K. Duncan.- 13. Contraception without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraception Mandates- Marta Podemska-Mikluch and Gustavus Adolphus.- 14. Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity- Meg Tuszynski and Richard E. Wagner.- Part III: Collective Action and Constitutional Political Economy.- 15. Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality- Dennis Mueller.- 16. Constitutional, Political, and Behavioral Feasibility- Alan Hamlin.- 17. Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution- Shruti Rajagopalan.- 18. Blockchains as Constitutional Orders- Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts.- 19. The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie- J.R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee.-20. Beneficent Bullshit- Peter T. Leeson.- 21. Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy- Jayme Lemke.- 22. Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom- Roberta Herzberg.- 23.  On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion- George Tridimas.- 24.  Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire- Adam Martin and James Ruhland.- Part IV: Ethics, Social Philosophy, and Liberal Political Economy.- 25. James M. Buchanan: Political; Economist, Consistent Individualist- Viktor Vanberg.- 26. A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional Project- Randall Holcombe.- 27. Buchanan’s Social Contract Unveiled- Enrico Colombatto.- 28. Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice- Georg Vanberg.- 29. Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar- Glenn L. Furton and Alexander W. Salter.- 30. Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions- Donald Boudreaux.- 31. James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals- David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart.- 32. From Highways to Clubs: On Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods- Alain Marciano.- Part V: Economic Theory as Social Theory.- 33. In Defence of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism- Jerry Gaus.- 34. Toward a Rule-based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus- Roger Congleton.- 35. The Constitution of Markets- Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt.- 36. The Extent of the Market and Ethics- Yong Yoon.- 37. Why Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government- Andrew T. Young.- 38. Rules vs. Discretion in Criminal Sentencing- Daniel D’Amico.- 39. Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist- Solomon Stein.- 40. From Models to Experiments: James Buchanan and Charles Plott- Gil Hersch and Daniel Houser.- Part VI: Money, Debt, and the Rule of Law.- 41. Rules Versus Authorities:  Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy- Marianne Johnson.- 42. The Quest for Fiscal Rules- Lars Feld.- 43. The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt- Vito Tanzi.- 44. Can there be such a thing as Legitimate Public Debt in a Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared- Giuseppe Eusepi.- 45. Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements- Leonidas Zelmanovitz.- Part VII: Buchanan in Relation to Other Prominent Scholars.- 46. Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program- Alain Marciano and Manuela Mosca.- 47. Paretian Fiscal Sociology- Michael McLure.- 48. Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice- Paul Dragos Aligica.- 49. The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic- Robert Bish.- 50. Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight’s Picture on the Wall despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics- Ross Emmett.

“This volume is so broad in scope, so rich in fascinating reflections, so instructive that anybody should benefit from it who has a genuine, if critical, interest in the work of James M. Buchanan. On this basis, it should be a pleasure to enter an informed, open discussion.” (Karen Horn, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 31, 2020)

Richard E. Wagner is Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University, USA. He is Senior Fellow of the Academic Advisory Board at the Independent Institute, the James Madison Institute for Public Policy Studies and the Virginia Institute for Public Policy. He was co-editor of the scholarly journal Constitutional Political Economy from 1989-1997, and he is currently a member of the editorial boards of Constitutional Political Economy, the Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, and the Review of Austrian Economics. He was one of Buchanan’s dissertation students, a co-author with Buchanan, and a faculty colleague for some 25 years.

• 1. Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why is He Significant?- Richard E. Wagner.- Part I:  Subjectivism and the Methodology of Political Economy.- 2. East Anglia, What Should Economists Do Now?- Robert Sugden.- 3. Duke, Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan- Michael Munger.- 4. Brown, James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist- Peter J. Boettke, George Mason and Rosolino Candela.- 5. James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Program- Stefan Kolev.- 6. George Mason, Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy- Abigail N. Devereaux, George Mason and Richard E. Wagner.- Part II: Public Finance and the Theory of the State.- 7. The Conflict between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods- Lawrence H. White.- 8. Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments- Charles Beat Blankart and David Ehmke.- 9. The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments- David Hebert.- 10. Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a mostly Private Good- Mark V. Pauly.- 11. Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand- Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones.- 12. The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons- Christopher J. Coyne and Thomas K. Duncan.- 13. Contraception without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraception Mandates- Marta Podemska-Mikluch and Gustavus Adolphus.- 14. Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity- Meg Tuszynski and Richard E. Wagner.- Part III: Collective Action and Constitutional Political Economy.- 15. Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality- Dennis Mueller.- 16. Constitutional, Political, and Behavioral Feasibility- Alan Hamlin.- 17. Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution- Shruti Rajagopalan.- 18. Blockchains as Constitutional Orders- Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts.- 19. The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie- J.R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee.-20. Beneficent Bullshit- Peter T. Leeson.- 21. Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy- Jayme Lemke.- 22. Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom- Roberta Herzberg.- 23.  On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion- George Tridimas.- 24.  Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire- Adam Martin and James Ruhland.- Part IV: Ethics, Social Philosophy, and Liberal Political Economy.- 25. James M. Buchanan: Political; Economist, Consistent Individualist- Viktor Vanberg.- 26. A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional Project- Randall Holcombe.- 27. Buchanan’s Social Contract Unveiled- Enrico Colombatto.- 28. Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice- Georg Vanberg.- 29. Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar- Glenn L. Furton and Alexander W. Salter.- 30. Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions- Donald Boudreaux.- 31. James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals- David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart.- 32. From Highways to Clubs: On Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods- Alain Marciano.- Part V: Economic Theory as Social Theory.- 33. In Defence of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism- Jerry Gaus.- 34. Toward a Rule-based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus- Roger Congleton.- 35. The Constitution of Markets- Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt.- 36. The Extent of the Market and Ethics- Yong Yoon.- 37. Why Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government- Andrew T. Young.- 38. Rules vs. Discretion in Criminal Sentencing- Daniel D’Amico.- 39. Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist- Solomon Stein.- 40. From Models to Experiments: James Buchanan and Charles Plott- Gil Hersch and Daniel Houser.- Part VI: Money, Debt, and the Rule of Law.- 41. Rules Versus Authorities:  Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy- Marianne Johnson.- 42. The Quest for Fiscal Rules- Lars Feld.- 43. The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt- Vito Tanzi.- 44. Can there be such a thing as Legitimate Public Debt in a Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared- Giuseppe Eusepi.- 45. Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements- Leonidas Zelmanovitz.- Part VII: Buchanan in Relation to Other Prominent Scholars.- 46. Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program- Alain Marciano and Manuela Mosca.- 47. Paretian Fiscal Sociology- Michael McLure.- 48. Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice- Paul Dragos Aligica.- 49. The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic- Robert Bish.- 50. Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight’s Picture on the Wall despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics- Ross Emmett.

“This volume is so broad in scope, so rich in fascinating reflections, so instructive that anybody should benefit from it who has a genuine, if critical, interest in the work of James M. Buchanan. On this basis, it should be a pleasure to enter an informed, open discussion.” (Karen Horn, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 31, 2020)

Richard E. Wagner is Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University, USA. He is Senior Fellow of the Academic Advisory Board at the Independent Institute, the James Madison Institute for Public Policy Studies and the Virginia Institute for Public Policy. He was co-editor of the scholarly journal Constitutional Political Economy from 1989-1997, and he is currently a member of the editorial boards of Constitutional Political Economy, the Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, and the Review of Austrian Economics. He was one of Buchanan’s dissertation students, a co-author with Buchanan, and a faculty colleague for some 25 years.

• 1. Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why is He Significant?- Richard E. Wagner.- Part I:  Subjectivism and the Methodology of Political Economy.- 2. East Anglia, What Should Economists Do Now?- Robert Sugden.- 3. Duke, Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan- Michael Munger.- 4. Brown, James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist- Peter J. Boettke, George Mason and Rosolino Candela.- 5. James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Program- Stefan Kolev.- 6. George Mason, Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy- Abigail N. Devereaux, George Mason and Richard E. Wagner.- Part II: Public Finance and the Theory of the State.- 7. The Conflict between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods- Lawrence H. White.- 8. Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments- Charles Beat Blankart and David Ehmke.- 9. The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments- David Hebert.- 10. Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a mostly Private Good- Mark V. Pauly.- 11. Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand- Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones.- 12. The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons- Christopher J. Coyne and Thomas K. Duncan.- 13. Contraception without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraception Mandates- Marta Podemska-Mikluch and Gustavus Adolphus.- 14. Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity- Meg Tuszynski and Richard E. Wagner.- Part III: Collective Action and Constitutional Political Economy.- 15. Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality- Dennis Mueller.- 16. Constitutional, Political, and Behavioral Feasibility- Alan Hamlin.- 17. Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution- Shruti Rajagopalan.- 18. Blockchains as Constitutional Orders- Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts.- 19. The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie- J.R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee.-20. Beneficent Bullshit- Peter T. Leeson.- 21. Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy- Jayme Lemke.- 22. Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom- Roberta Herzberg.- 23.  On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion- George Tridimas.- 24.  Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire- Adam Martin and James Ruhland.- Part IV: Ethics, Social Philosophy, and Liberal Political Economy.- 25. James M. Buchanan: Political; Economist, Consistent Individualist- Viktor Vanberg.- 26. A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional Project- Randall Holcombe.- 27. Buchanan’s Social Contract Unveiled- Enrico Colombatto.- 28. Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice- Georg Vanberg.- 29. Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar- Glenn L. Furton and Alexander W. Salter.- 30. Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions- Donald Boudreaux.- 31. James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals- David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart.- 32. From Highways to Clubs: On Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods- Alain Marciano.- Part V: Economic Theory as Social Theory.- 33. In Defence of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism- Jerry Gaus.- 34. Toward a Rule-based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus- Roger Congleton.- 35. The Constitution of Markets- Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt.- 36. The Extent of the Market and Ethics- Yong Yoon.- 37. Why Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government- Andrew T. Young.- 38. Rules vs. Discretion in Criminal Sentencing- Daniel D’Amico.- 39. Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist- Solomon Stein.- 40. From Models to Experiments: James Buchanan and Charles Plott- Gil Hersch and Daniel Houser.- Part VI: Money, Debt, and the Rule of Law.- 41. Rules Versus Authorities:  Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy- Marianne Johnson.- 42. The Quest for Fiscal Rules- Lars Feld.- 43. The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt- Vito Tanzi.- 44. Can there be such a thing as Legitimate Public Debt in a Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared- Giuseppe Eusepi.- 45. Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements- Leonidas Zelmanovitz.- Part VII: Buchanan in Relation to Other Prominent Scholars.- 46. Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program- Alain Marciano and Manuela Mosca.- 47. Paretian Fiscal Sociology- Michael McLure.- 48. Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice- Paul Dragos Aligica.- 49. The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic- Robert Bish.- 50. Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight’s Picture on the Wall despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics- Ross Emmett.

“This volume is so broad in scope, so rich in fascinating reflections, so instructive that anybody should benefit from it who has a genuine, if critical, interest in the work of James M. Buchanan. On this basis, it should be a pleasure to enter an informed, open discussion.” (Karen Horn, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 31, 2020)