International ‘Criminal’ Responsibility

Ottavio Quirico is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Law at the University of New England in Australia, an Honorary Lecturer at the Centre for European Studies of the Australian National University and an Alumnus of the European University Institute.

• CasesDocumentsAbbreviationsForewordIntroduction ContextAnalysisChapter 1 – From monism to dualism1.1 Monism: coordinating individual and State responsibility prior to World War II1.1.1 The dawn of criminal responsibility in international law: proposals for a universal criminal code (1860-1919)1.1.2. Inter-war coordination (1920-1939)1.1.2.1 Triggering initiatives within the League of Nations1.1.2.2 Establishing the Fundamental Principles of an International Legal Code for the Repression of International Crimes1.1.2.3 Individual initiatives for a comprehensive International Criminal Code 1.1.2.4 The ICLA’s Draft Statute for a Criminal Chamber of the PCIJ and the Global Repressive Code1.2 Dualism: disjoining individual and State responsibility after World War II1.2.1 Between coordination and disjunction (1940-1960)1.2.1.1 Peace through law? UN procedures and the critical role of the Security Council1.2.1.2 The IMT, IMTFE, Nuremberg Principles and Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind1.2.1.3 The Genocide Convention and the proposals for an international criminal jurisdiction1.2.2 Defining aggression, State crimes and underlying concepts (1960-1980)1.2.2.1 Non-institutional initiatives1.2.2.2 Peremptory norms (jus cogens), erga omnes obligations and State crimes1.2.2.3 State crimes under Article 19 of the ILC’s 1980 Draft Articles on State Responsibility1.2.3 Codifying dualism (1980-2001)1.2.3.1 The ICLA’s Project for a comprehensive International Criminal Code1.2.3.2 Achieving the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1.2.3.3 Ad hoc international and hybrid tribunals1.2.3.4 Achieving the Statute of the International Criminal Court1.2.3.5 From ‘State crimes’ to ‘serious breaches of peremptory norms’ in the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility1.2.4 Genocide, aggression and terrorism still in search of identity (2001-2018)1.2.4.1 Genocide in the jurisprudence of the ICJ: the ‘second death’ of State crimes?1.2.4.2 Aggression and terrorism: developments in the ICC Statute and beyondChapter 2 – Breach of a primary norm: offence2.1 Core substantive elements of the offence2.1.1 The obligations breached by State aggravated offences 2.1.1.1 Serious breaches of peremptory norms (jus cogens): 2001 DASR 402.1.1.2 Linking jus cogens and erga omnes obligations: VCLT and VCLTIO Article 53 and 2001 DASR 40, 42, 48 and 542.1.1.3 Serious breaches of erga omnes obligations: 1996 DASR 19 and 402.1.1.4 Fundamental obligations2.1.1.5 Jus cogens, erga omnes obligations and State responsibility in international case law2.1.2 Individual criminal responsibility, jus cogens and erga omnes obligations2.1.2.1 From criminals to crimes: erga omnes responsibility in the ICC Statute2.1.2.2 Erga omnes responsibility in the case law2.1.3 State aggravated responsibility, individual criminal responsibility, jus cogens and (non-severable) erga omnes obligations2.1.3.1 (Non-severable) erga omnes obligations as jus cogens2.1.3.2 State aggravated offences and individual criminal offences as breaches of (non-severable) erga omnes obligations2.2 Attribution of responsibility2.2.1 Dual conduct2.2.1.1 Attributing aggravated responsibility to the State based on conduct of its organs or agents: absolute identity?2.2.1.2 Individual responsibility for international crimes: mens rea2.2.2 Attributing individual criminal conduct to the State2.2.2.1 Individual mens rea versus State objective responsibility?2.2.2.2 Individual and State mens rea?2.2.2.3 Assessing State fault on a case-by-case basis under the ILC’s DASR2.3 Dual erga omnes offences2.3.1 Aggression2.3.1.1 State conduct as a basis for individual conduct (and vice-versa)2.3.1.2 Leadership and mens rea2.3.1.3 Self-Defence as a dual excuse2.3.2 Core war crimes2.3.2.1 Individual conduct as a basis for collective responsibility2.3.2.2 Systemically proving individual mens rea2.3.3 Core crimes against humanity2.3.3.1 Systemic conduct2.3.3.2 Systemically proving individual mens rea2.3.4 Genocide2.3.4.1 Individual genocidal conduct without State responsibility?2.3.4.2 Collective specific intent as a basis for individual intent (and vice-versa)2.3.5 Terrorism2.3.5.1 Political or ideological purpose as a distinguishing material element2.3.5.2 Specific intent and collective responsibilityChapter 3 – Secondary norms: dispute settlement, sanctions and enforcement3.1 Secondary and tertiary implications of dual erga omnes offences3.1.1 State aggravated responsibility3.1.1.1 Institutionalised and non-institutionalised (compulsory) universal invocation of responsibility: 2001 DASR 41(1), 42(b), 48(1)(b) and 593.1.1.2 Non-punitive erga omnes sanctions? 2001 DASR 28-39 and UN Charter Articles 39-423.1.1.3 Institutionalised and non-institutionalised universal enforcement: 2001 DASR 41(1), 54 and 593.1.1.4 Rejecting compulsory jurisdiction3.1.1.5 Punitive erga omnes sanctions? 1996 DASR 41-46 and 523.1.1.6 Universal punitive enforcement? 1996 DASR 533.1.2 Individual criminal responsibility3.1.2.1 (Compulsory) universal jurisdiction and complementary international adjudication3.1.2.2 (Erga omnes) imprisonment, fines and forfeiture3.1.2.3 Domestic enforcement3.2 Procedural intersections 3.2.1 Systemic patterns and inter-temporality3.2.2 The limits of UN procedures3.2.2.1 Chapter VII procedures: political and enforcement action for State aggravated responsibility?3.2.2.2 The limited role of consensual jurisdiction, particularly the International Court of Justice3.2.2 Decentralised State action under general international law3.2.3 A controversial practice3.2.3.1 Bosnian genocide3.2.3.2 Humanitarian crises in Kosovo, Libya and Syria3.2.3.3 Iraq wars3.2.3.4 Counter-terrorism in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq3.2.4 State and individual immunities as a bar to domestic jurisdiction?3.2.4.1 State and individual immunities?3.2.4.2 Intersections3.2.5 Ad hoc criminal jurisdictions: victors’ justice?3.2.5.1 Power and organic dependence3.2.5.2 Ex post jurisdictions3.2.6 The independence of the International Criminal Court3.2.6.1 Permanency as a guarantee of independence?3.2.6.2 The UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court 3.2.6.3 Jurisdictional autonomy over aggression?ConclusionAntinomiesWays forwardBibliographyIndex