Intelligence Success and Failure

Uri Bar-Joseph is a Professor at the School of Political Science, Haifa University, Israel. He concentrates on strategic and intelligence studies, especially focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israeli security policy. In addition to numerous refereed journal articles and book chapters, he wrote six books, the most recent of which is The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel (2016).Rose McDermott is the David and Mariana Fisher University Professor of International Relations at Brown University and a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has held fellowships at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Women and Public Policy Program, all at Harvard University. She has been a fellow at the Stanford Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences twice. She is the author of four books, a co-editor of two additional volumes, and author of over a hundred academic articles across a wide variety of disciplines encompassing topics such as experimentation, emotion and decision making, and the biological and genetic bases of political behavior.

• Contents Introduction Part One: The Theoretical Framework Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for DiscussionChapter II. Examining the Learning ProcessPart Two: The Empirical Evidence The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for MoscowCase Study I: The FailureCase Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur Case Study I: The FailureCase Study II: The SuccessChapter VI. Conclusions

"Bar-Joseph and McDermott develop a theoretical framework related to the human factor in explaining success and failure in three wars: the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941; the Korean War in 1950; and the Arab attack on Israel in 1973... Recommended." --CHOICE"Psychological dysfunctions have long been a preoccupation of post-mortems on intelligence failures. Bar-Joseph and McDermott contribute important insights of this sort regarding failures in warning and response. More importantly, however, they go further to apply them in powerful ways to the all-too neglected dimension of intelligence studies: cases of success in assessment and decision. Their study provides new perspectives on old cases and useful lessonsfor future analysts." --Richard K. Betts, Director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, and author of Enemies of Intelligence"This fascinating book, based on a series of important case studies, moves the reader squarely into the realm of psychology - a discipline too often ignored in political science and national security studies - as these outstanding authors search for reasons why some policymakers are unable to understand and cope with indicators that point toward an incipient surprise attack." --Dr. Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of International Affairs, University of Georgia"This finely crafted study makes a major contribution to the intelligence literature. It is an extraordinary combination of theory and historical detail that enriches and adds a new dimension to our understanding of intelligence and deterrence failure." --James J. Wirtz, Dean, School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School"The field is full of studies of intelligence failures, but a good understanding of them requires comparisons to intelligence successes. Bar-Joseph and McDermott have done this brilliantly, extending both our theoretical grasp of the subject and the empirical knowledge of important cases." --Robert Jervis, Author of Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War"This is the most significant step forward in years in the literature on the warning of surprise by intelligence services and leaders' response to warnings. It should be required reading for students of intelligence, national security policy making, and history." --Michael Morell, former Acting Director, Deputy Director, and Chief Analyst, the Central Intelligence Agency