Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union

Marek A. Cichocki, Programme Director, Natolin European Centre, Institute of Applied Social Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland and Karol Zyczkowski, Professor, Jagiellonian University, Poland

• Introduction; I: Voting System for the Council of European Union; 1: Is the Double Majority Really Double? The Voting Rules in the Lisbon Treaty 1; 2: Penrose's Square-Root Rule and the EU Council of Ministers; 3: Jagiellonian Compromise – An Alternative Voting System for the Council of the European Union; 4: The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union; 5: The Blocking Power in Voting Systems; 6: The Distribution of Power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union; II: Distribution of Power in the European Union; 7: The Distribution of Power in the European Cluster Game; 8: The Constitutional Power of Voters in the European Parliament; 9: Decision Rules and Intergovernmentalism in the European Union; 10: On the Relative Unimportance of Voting Weights; 11: Patterns of Voting in the Council of Ministers of the European Union; 12: Decision-Making in the EU Council after the First Eastern Enlargement; III: Allocation of Seats in the European Parliament; 13: Degressive Proportionality; 14: Putting Citizens First; 15: Comparative Analysis of Several Methods for Determining the Composition of the European Parliament; 16: On Bounds for Allocation of Seats in the European Parliament; 17: Conclusions

'Making informed choices in politics is very important. This book offers a common sense approach towards decision making in the EU based on clear scientific reasoning. I hope that it might become of interest for decision-makers.' Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, former Polish Minister for European Affairs, Member of the European Parliament