Individuality and Entanglement

Herbert Gintis is an external professor at the Santa Fe Institute. He is the author, coauthor, or coeditor of a number of books, including Game Theory Evolving, The Bounds of Reason, Unequal Chances, A Cooperative Species, and Game Theory in Action (all Princeton).

• Overview xi 1 Gene-Culture Coevolution 1 1.1 Culture Determines Biological Fitness 3 1.2 Reciprocal Causality 7 1.3 The Physiology of Human Communication 9 2 Zoon Politikon: The Evolutionary Origins of Human Socio-political Systems 12 2.1 Accounting for Human Exceptionalism 12 2.2 Models of Political Power 13 2.3 The Moral Basis of Modern Political Systems 16 2.4 The Socio-political Structure of Primate Societies 18 2.5 The Evolutionary History of Primate Societies 22 2.6 Fire and Social Sharing 23 2.7 From Gatherer to Scavenger 24 2.8 Primitive Lethal Weapons 26 2.9 Warfare 30 2.10 Dominance and Reverse Dominance Hierarchies 31 2.11 Are There Egalitarian Nonhuman Primates? 37 2.12 Governance by Consent 38 2.13 Cooperative Mothering: The Evolution of Prosociality 40 2.14 Lethal Weapons and Egalitarianism 40 2.15 The Long-Term Evolution of Human Sociality 42 3 Distributed Effectivity: Political Theory and Rational Choice 45 3.1 Public and Private Spheres 47 3.2 Private and Public Persona 49 3.3 Social Rationality 51 3.4 The Social Rationality of Voter Turnout 55 3.5 The Logic of Distributed Effectivity 59 3.6 Situating Distributed Effectivity 63 4 Power and Trust in CompetitiveMarkets 67 4.1 The Short-Side Power Principle 68 4.2 Power in Competitive Markets 73 4.3 Trust and Integrity 74 4.4 Reputational Equilibrium 79 4.5 Contingent Renewal Labor Markets 80 4.6 I'd Rather Fight than Switch 84 4.7 Regulating Market Power 87 5 Rational Choice Revealed and Defended 88 5.1 The Axioms of Rational Choice 92 5.2 Choice Under Uncertainty 94 5.3 Bayesian Updating with Radical Uncertainty 97 5.4 State-Dependent Preferences 98 5.5 Networked Minds and Distributed Cognition 100 5.6 Limitations of the Rational Actor Model 101 6 An Analytical Core for Sociology 109 6.1 Game Theory 111 6.2 Complexity 115 6.3 Roles, Actors, and the Division of Social Labor 117 6.4 The Socio-psychological Theory of Norms 121 6.5 Socialization and the Internalization of Norms 123 6.6 A Model of Norm Internalization 124 6.7 The Evolution of Social Conventions 126 6.8 The Omniscient Choreographer and Moral Preferences 129 6.9 The Evolution of Norm Internalization 131 6.10 Modeling NetworkedMinds 133 6.11 Class Structure in General Social Equilibrium 135 6.12 Resurrecting Sociological Theory 138 7 The Theory of Action Reclaimed 140 7.1 The Moral and Material Bases of Choice 145 7.2 Carving an Academic Niche for Sociology 148 7.3 The Parsonian Synthesis 150 7.4 The Attempt to Separate Morality from Rationality 153 7.5 Why Did Parsons Fail? 157 7.6 The Flourishing of Middle-Range Theory 160 7.7 High Theory as Interpretation 163 8 The Evolution of Property 165 8.1 The Endowment Effect 166 8.2 Territoriality 168 8.3 Property Rights in Young Children 171 8.4 Respect for Possession in Nonhuman Animals 171 8.5 Conditions for a Property Equilibrium 174 8.6 Property and Antiproperty Equilibria 177 8.7 An Antiproperty Equilibrium 182 8.8 Property Rights as Choreographer 184 9 The Sociology of the Genome 186 9.1 The Core Genome 191 9.2 Inclusive Fitness and Hamilton's Rule 195 9.3 Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness 201 9.4 A Generalized Hamilton's Rule 205 9.5 Harmony and Disharmony Principles 207 9.6 The Utterly Selfish Nature of the Gene 208 9.7 Prosocial Genes Maximize Inclusive Fitness 210 9.8 The Boundaries of Inclusive Fitness Maximization 211 9.9 The One Mutation at a Time Principle 212 9.10 The Phenotypic Gambit 213 9.11 The Anatomy of the Core Genome 214 9.12 Explaining Social Structure 218 A1 Hamilton's Rule with General Social Interaction 219 10 Gene-Culture Coevolution and the Internalization of Norms 227 10.1 Norms and Internalization 227 10.2 Socialization and Fitness-Enhancing Norms 229 10.3 Altruism 233 10.4 Copying Phenotypes: The Replicator Dynamic 237 10.5 Why is Altruism Predominantly Prosocial? 238 10.6 The Power of Altruistic Punishment 241 10.7 Final Considerations 243 11 The Economy as Complex Dynamical System 246 11.1 The General Equilibrium Model Explained 247 11.2 The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics 250 11.3 The Market Economy as a Dynamic Game 252 11.4 The Walrasian Economy 253 11.5 Exchange Processes with Private Prices 255 11.6 Strict Nash Equilibria and Stability 256 11.7 The Characterization of Stable Exchange Processes 256 11.8 A Markov Implementation of Walrasian Dynamics 261 11.9 Complex Dynamics 264 12 The Future of the Behavioral Sciences 267 12.1 What are Analytical Foundations? 271 12.2 Cross-Disciplinary Conflicts in the Behavioral Sciences 274 Acknowledgments 279 References 281 Subject Index 341 Author Index 345

"This is a masterly and path-breaking book by one of the most complete behavioral scientists of all time, Herbert Gintis. It seeks to unify the behavioral sciences and to provide a core analytical framework. It should be required reading for every student of behavioral science and will play a critical role in the development of the behavioral sciences. . . . I would unhesitatingly give it a five-star-plus rating."---Sanjit Dhami, Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture