In the Shadow of Power

Robert Powell is Robson Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He has written widely on the application of game theory to issues in strategic studies and international relations theory. He is the author of Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility and coeditor of Strategic Choice and International Relations.

• Preface vii Chapter 1 States and Strategies 3 Chapter 2 Guns, Butter, and Internal Balancing in the Shadow of Power 40 Chapter 3 Bargaining in the Shadow of Power 82 Chapter 4 Bargaining in the Shadow of Shifting Power 115 Chapter 5 Alignment Decisions in the Shadow of Power 149 Chapter 6 Conclusion 197 Appendix 1 Game Trees, Strategies, and Equilibria 225 Appendix 2 The Formalities of the Guns-versus-Butter Model 233 Appendix 3 The Formalities of Bargaining in the Shadow of Power 243 Appendix 4 The Formalities of Bargaining in the Shadow of Shifting Power 272 Appendix 5 The Formalities of the Alignment Model 283 References 291 Index 305

Winner of the 2000 Conflict Processes Book Award, American Political Science Association Winner of the 2000 Best Book Award, Political Economy Section of the American Political Science Association One of Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles for 2000 "Robert Powell enjoys a deserved reputation as the premier formal modeler in the field of international security studies. This book can only enhance that reputation... The book is extremely valuable for the coherence it imposes on previously unintegrated processes."--Glenn Snyder, Political Science Quarterly "A welcome attempt to make the modeling enterprise accessible and understandable to nonpractitioners. Along the way it makes a concise and coherent case for why modeling can increase our understanding of international relations."--Colin Elman, Journal of Cold War Studies