Illusionism is the view that phenomenal consciousness (in the philosophers' sense) is an introspective illusion — that introspection misrepresents experiences as having phenomenal properties. This view has many theoretical attractions, but it is often dismissed out of hand for failing to take consciousness seriously. The aim of this volume is to present the case for illusionism, discuss objections to it, and stimulate debate about this important but relatively neglected position. The book, which is a reprint of a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, takes the form of a target paper by the editor, followed by commentaries from various thinkers, including leading defenders of illusionism, such as Daniel Dennett, Nicholas Humphrey, Derk Pereboom, and Georges Rey. A number of disciplines are represented, and there are commentaries from critics of illusionism as well as supporters. The collection is tied together with a response to the commentators from the editor.

Illusionism is the view that phenomenal consciousness (in the philosophers' sense) is an introspective illusion — that introspection misrepresents experiences as having phenomenal properties. This view has many theoretical attractions, but it is often dismissed out of hand for failing to take consciousness seriously. The aim of this volume is to present the case for illusionism, discuss objections to it, and stimulate debate about this important but relatively neglected position. The book, which is a reprint of a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, takes the form of a target paper by the editor, followed by commentaries from various thinkers, including leading defenders of illusionism, such as Daniel Dennett, Nicholas Humphrey, Derk Pereboom, and Georges Rey. A number of disciplines are represented, and there are commentaries from critics of illusionism as well as supporters. The collection is tied together with a response to the commentators from the editor.

Illusionism is the view that phenomenal consciousness (in the philosophers' sense) is an introspective illusion — that introspection misrepresents experiences as having phenomenal properties. This view has many theoretical attractions, but it is often dismissed out of hand for failing to take consciousness seriously. The aim of this volume is to present the case for illusionism, discuss objections to it, and stimulate debate about this important but relatively neglected position. The book, which is a reprint of a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, takes the form of a target paper by the editor, followed by commentaries from various thinkers, including leading defenders of illusionism, such as Daniel Dennett, Nicholas Humphrey, Derk Pereboom, and Georges Rey. A number of disciplines are represented, and there are commentaries from critics of illusionism as well as supporters. The collection is tied together with a response to the commentators from the editor.