Matthew Kramer is Professor of Legal and Political Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and a Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge.

• Preface vii1 A Discourse on Method 11 Posing the questions 22 Elucidation of a concept 43 A method of central instances 54 A philosophical scope 85 Variations across societies 116 A descriptive-explanatory methodology 127 A reductionist ambition? 238 A naturalistic ambition? 282 Hart on Legal Powers and Law’s Normativity 321 The Austinian model of law 332 Power-conferring laws 363 Legislators bound 524 Custom-derived laws 535 Limits on sovereignty 563 The Components of Hart’s Jurisprudential Theory 601 The internal/external distinction 612 The simulative point of view 653 The blurring of distinctions between viewpoints 684 Primary norms and secondary norms: the general distinction 705 Primary norms and secondary norms: Hart’s thought-experiment 746 The Rule of Recognition: to whom is it addressed? 787 The Rule of Recognition: power-conferring and duty-imposing 818 The unity of the Rule of Recognition: disagreements over details 849 The unity of the Rule of Recognition: multiple criteria 8510 The unity of the Rule of Recognition: institutional hierarchies 8811 The ultimacy of the Rule of Recognition 9112 The Rule of Recognition: the foundational level and the codified level 9213 The intertwining of the Rule of Recognition and other secondary norms 9714 Interdependent but distinct: a riposte to Shapiro 9915 Interdependent but distinct: a riposte to Waldron 10116 Interdependent but distinct: a riposte to MacCormick 10317 The problem of circularity 10518 Necessary and sufficient conditions 1074 Hart on Legal Interpretation and Legal Reasoning 1101 Crucial distinctions 1122 Hart on formalism and rule-skepticism 1335 Law and Morality 1481 Separability theses 1492 Hart on the minimum content of natural law 1643 Inclusive versus Exclusive Positivism 1734 Hart as an expressivist? 1806 Conclusion 204Notes 207References 215Index 222

"Matthew Kramer is one of the most important figures in legal theory today. His deep analysis of H.L.A. Hart's legal philosophy will be an invaluable resource for scholars and serious students of jurisprudence."—Brian Bix, University of Minnesota"Written with Kramer’s characteristic care and attention to detail, this marvelous book provides a sympathetic, yet critical, account of Hart's views on the nature of law and of legal reasoning. A valuable source of insight for student and seasoned scholar alike."—Wil Waluchow, McMaster University