Michael Klenk works at the intersection of metaethics, epistemology, and moral psychology. His published papers on these topics in Synthese, Ratio, the Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, and the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, among others. He works at Delft University of Technology and held visiting positions at St. Gallen and Stanford University.

• Change in Moral View: Higher-Order Evidence and Moral EpistemologyMichael KlenkPart I: Higher-Order Evidence against Morality1. Evolutionary Debunking, Self-Defeat and All the EvidenceSilvan Wittwer2. Moral Intuitions Between Higher-Order Evidence and Wishful ThinkingNorbert Paulo3. Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck EpistemologyPaul Silva4. Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order EvidenceOlle Risberg & Folke TersmanPart II: Rebutting Higher-Order Evidence against Morality5. Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral EpistemologyBrian C. Barnett6. Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order EvidenceMarco Tiozzo7. Debunking ScepticismMichael HuemerPart III: Broader Implications of Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology8. Moral Testimony as Higher-Order EvidenceMarcus Lee, Neil Sinclair, & Jon Robson9. Higher-Order Defeat in Collective Moral EpistemologyJ. Adam Carter & Dario Mortini10. The Fragile Epistemology of FanaticismJoshua DiPaoloPart IV: Permissible Epistemic Attitudes in Response to Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology11. How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral DisagreementMargaret Greta Turnbull & Eric Sampson12. Epistemic Non-Factualism and MethodologyJustin Clarke-Doane

"In sum, this is a rich collection of essays from which researchers and students in both epistemology and moral philosophy will benefit. It both deepens and broadens our understanding of higher-order evidence, disagreement, and debunking arguments, and I expect several of the essays in this collection will influence future work of these issues." – Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews