It is common knowledge that ‘great powers’, especially the United States and China, exert economic, political and military dominance over the world. But several middle powers, including those in the Gulf region, especially Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are changing tack. They are increasingly exerting influence through several Cs: crude (oil), capital, commerce, collaboration, cyber (technology), climate, connectivity, competition, and compromise. The chapters of this book argue that the abovementioned factors are rooted more in geoeconomics and less in geopolitics, with very little focus on military dynamics. The book stitches together a narrative promoting the idea that pursuing any or many of these Cs makes these countries relatively more pragmatic, thus enabling them to focus and further their economic agenda and growth. This has helped them to punch above their weight, not just in the economic domain, but also in the political sphere. Encouraged by the fragmented world order, the Gulf middle powers are pursuing multialigned strategies. They are simultaneously straddling separate partnerships, not alliances, with the United States and China, and building other networks in a world that is witnessing the rise of new markets and power centres.

It is common knowledge that ‘great powers’, especially the United States and China, exert economic, political and military dominance over the world. But several middle powers, including those in the Gulf region, especially Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are changing tack. They are increasingly exerting influence through several Cs: crude (oil), capital, commerce, collaboration, cyber (technology), climate, connectivity, competition, and compromise. The chapters of this book argue that the abovementioned factors are rooted more in geoeconomics and less in geopolitics, with very little focus on military dynamics. The book stitches together a narrative promoting the idea that pursuing any or many of these Cs makes these countries relatively more pragmatic, thus enabling them to focus and further their economic agenda and growth. This has helped them to punch above their weight, not just in the economic domain, but also in the political sphere. Encouraged by the fragmented world order, the Gulf middle powers are pursuing multialigned strategies. They are simultaneously straddling separate partnerships, not alliances, with the United States and China, and building other networks in a world that is witnessing the rise of new markets and power centres.

It is common knowledge that ‘great powers’, especially the United States and China, exert economic, political and military dominance over the world. But several middle powers, including those in the Gulf region, especially Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are changing tack. They are increasingly exerting influence through several Cs: crude (oil), capital, commerce, collaboration, cyber (technology), climate, connectivity, competition, and compromise. The chapters of this book argue that the abovementioned factors are rooted more in geoeconomics and less in geopolitics, with very little focus on military dynamics. The book stitches together a narrative promoting the idea that pursuing any or many of these Cs makes these countries relatively more pragmatic, thus enabling them to focus and further their economic agenda and growth. This has helped them to punch above their weight, not just in the economic domain, but also in the political sphere. Encouraged by the fragmented world order, the Gulf middle powers are pursuing multialigned strategies. They are simultaneously straddling separate partnerships, not alliances, with the United States and China, and building other networks in a world that is witnessing the rise of new markets and power centres.