Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems

Theory and Implications for Reforms

Häftad, Tyska, 2002

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Markus Berndt explains the observable evolution and persistence of differences in financial systems by elaborating on the influence of network effects on corporate governance systems. He develops a coherent theoretical framework pulling together existing agency theories and providing new theoretical foundations wherever there is a gap in the current theoretical understanding of corporate governance.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2002-08-30
Mått148 x 210 x 10 mm
Vikt221 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkTyska
SerieÖkonomische Analyse des Rechts
Antal sidor143
Upplaga2002
FörlagDeutscher Universitats-Verlag
ISBN9783824476947

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Rättsvetenskap inom Juridik
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1. Introduction.- 2. Differences in Corporate Governance Systems.- 2.1 Components of a Corporate Governance System - Scope of the Analysis.- 2.2 Empirical Evidence.- 2.3 Explanations for the Evolution of Different Systems.- 2.4 Explanations for the Persistence of Different Systems.- 3. Analytical Framework.- 3.1 Purpose of Corporate Governance.- 3.2 The Role of Institutions and Law.- 4. Dispersed Control - the Outsider System.- 4.1 Takeover Market and the Agency Costs of Dispersed Control.- 4.2 Institutional Innovation.- 4.3 A Case for Mandatory Disclosure.- 5. Concentrated Control - the Insider System.- 5.1 Differences with Dispersed Control.- 5.2 Modeling the Reputation Mechanism of Concentrated Control.- 5.3 Implications.- 5.4 Legislative Intervention.- 6. Network Effects via Capital Markets.- 6.1 Influence of Corporate Governance on Capital Market Liquidity.- 6.2 The Influence of Capital Market Liquidity on Corporate Governance.- 6.3 Resulting Network Effects.- 7. Evolutionary Model.- 7.1 Intention and Structure.- 7.2 Setup.- 7.3 Control Strategy.- 7.4 Legislation and Financial System.- 8. Implications for Corporate Governance Reforms.- 8.1 Sequencing of Reforms.- 8.2 Hysteresis of Inefficient Systems.- 8.4 An Outlook on Privatization Strategies.- 9. The Influence of Coordination Benefits on Corporate Governance and Accounting Standards.- 9.1 Objective of this Chapter.- 9.2 Setup.- 9.3 Equilibria.- 9.4 Social Welfare.- 9.5 Implications of the Coordination Model.- 10. Conclusion.- Appendix: Difference between Entry-Inducement and Entry-Deterrence -A Theoretical Note.- References.