Getting Incentives Right

Robert D. Cooter is the Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. His books include Solomon's Knot, The Strategic Constitution (both Princeton), and Law and Economics. Ariel Porat is the Alain Poher Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University and the Fischel-Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. His books include Tort Liability under Uncertainty, Torts, and Contributory Fault in the Law of Contracts.

• Acknowledgments vii Introduction 1 I. Torts and Misalignments 13 1. Prices, Sanctions, and Discontinuities 17 2. The Injurer's Self-Risk Puzzle 32 3. Negligence Per Se and Unaccounted Risks 47 4. Lapses and Substitution 61 5. Total Liability for Excessive Harm 74 II. Contracts and Victims' Incentives 89 6. Unity in the Law of Torts and Contracts 92 7. Anti-Insurance 105 8. Decreasing Liability Contracts and the Assistant Interest 128 III. Restitution and Positive Externalities 149 9. A Public Goods Theory of Restitution 151 10. Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices 165 11. The Relationship between Nonlegal Sanctions and Damages 187 Conclusion 207 Table of Cases 211 Table of Books and Articles 213 Subject Index 220

"Getting Incentives Right does just as the book's title says, and does so in a way that will startle and educate novices as well as seasoned economists and lawyers, not to mention law professors and their students. The book guides readers to places where multiple parties and margins are accounted for, casting brilliant light on important legal problems."—Saul Levmore, University of Chicago Law School