Game Theory

An Introduction with Step-by-Step Examples

Häftad, Engelska, 2023

AvAna Espinola-Arredondo,Felix Muñoz-Garcia

699 kr

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An introduction to game theory, complete with step-by-step tools and detailed examples. This book offers condensed breakdowns of game-theory concepts.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2023-12-19
Mått155 x 235 x 31 mm
Vikt730 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor455
FörlagSpringer International Publishing AG
ISBN9783031375767

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Ana Espinola-Arredondo is Associate Director and Professor in the School of Economic Sciences at Washington State University, USA. Espinola-Arredondo has published numerous articles and she and Felix Muñoz-Garcia have co-authored three other books together: Common Pool Resources: Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information (2021), Intermediate Economic Theory: Tools and Step-by-Step Examples (2020), and Practice Exercises for Intermediate Economic Theory (2020, also with Eric Dunaway and John C. Strandholm).Felix Muñoz-Garcia is Professor in the School of Economic Sciences at Washington State University, USA. Muñoz-Garcia has published many journal articles and he and Espinola-Arredondo have co-authored three other books, along with other textbooks such as Advanced Microeconomic Theory: An Intuitive Approach with Examples (2017), and Industrial Organization: Practice Exercises with Answer Keys (2021, with Pak-Sing Choi and Eric Dunaway).

Chapter 1. Introduction to games and their representation.-Chapter 2. Equilibrium dominance.-Chapter 3. Nash equilibrium.-Chapter 4. Nash equilibria in games with continuous action spaces.-Chapter 5. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.- Chapter 6. Subgame perfect equilibrium.- Chapter 7. Repeated games.- Chapter 8. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.- Chapter 9. Auction theory.- Chapter 10. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.- Chapter 11. Equilibrium Refinements.- Chapter 12. Signaling games with continuous messages.- Chapter 13. Cheap talk games.