Game Theory for Applied Econometricians

Data Analytics with R

Inbunden, Engelska, 2025

Av Christopher P. Adams, Christopher P. (Federal Trade Commission) Adams

1 599 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar

Fri frakt för medlemmar vid köp för minst 249 kr.

Over the last 30 years the practice and use of game theory has changed dramatically, yet textbooks continue to present game theory with algebraic formalism and toy models. This book, on the other hand, illustrates game theory concepts using real-world data and analyses problems with real policy implications. The focus is on applying current learning to real world problems by providing an introduction to game theory and econometric analysis based on game theoretic principles using the computer language R.The book covers the standard topics of an introductory game theory course including dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium. It layers on top of this an approach to statistics and econometrics called Structural Modeling. In this approach, key parameter estimates rely upon game theoretic analysis. The real-world examples used to illustrate these concepts vary in scope and include an analysis of bargaining between hospitals and insurers, equilibrium entry of retail tire stores, bid rigging in timber auctions and contracts in 19th century whaling.This book is aimed at the general reader with the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in economics, statistics or some more technical field. The book could be used as a text for an upper level undergraduate course or a lower level graduate course in economics or business.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2025-05-22
Mått156 x 234 x 21 mm
Vikt680 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieChapman and Hall/CRC Series on Statistics in Business and Economics
Antal sidor258
FörlagTaylor & Francis Ltd
ISBN9781032398334

Tillhör följande kategorier

Chris Adams was born and raised in Melbourne Australia and is a lifelong Carlton supporter. Chris received his PhD in economics from the University of Wisconsin - Madison. He has taught at the University of Vermont, Dartmouth College, University Maryland and Johns Hopkins. He has 17 years experience working in merger regulation and antitrust for the US Federal Trade Commission. He is currently a Principal Analyst at the US Congressional Budget Office. Chris’ work and research focus on econometrics, empirical industrial organization, pharmaceutical innovation and auctions. His work has been published in various academic journals including The Econometrics Journal, Health Affairs, Health Economics, Marketing Science and Economics Letters. Chris is a colon cancer survivor and a research patient advocate with ECOG-ACRIN. Most importantly, he is a father to CJ and husband to Deena.

Introduction Part I. Static Games of Complete Information 1. Games 2. Nash Equilibrium 3. Oligopoly 4. Empirical Entry Games 5. Mixed Strategies Part II. Dynamic Games of Complete Information 6. Dynamic Games 7. Repeated Games 8. Bargaining Part III. Static Games of Incomplete Information 9. Bayes Nash Equilibrium 10. Auctions 11. Auctions with Affiliated Valuations Part IV. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 12. Moral Hazard 13. Adverse Selection Bibliography