Del 14 - Economic Approaches to Law series

Game Theory and the Law

Inbunden, Engelska, 2007

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Game Theory and the Law is a collection of previously published articles in which ideas from game theory and the economics of asymmetric information are applied to legal issues. Game theory's method is to simplify a situation by describing it in terms of players, actions, payoffs, after which the players' strategic interactions can be described. Whether used explicitly or implicitly, this is a highly useful approach to law. This important volume collects together the classic articles on the subject together with surveys of the approach and illustrative examples of the use of game theory in law.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2007-11-27
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieEconomic Approaches to Law series
FörlagEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd
ISBN9781845426408

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Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Eric B. RasmusenPART IGENERAL 1. Ian Ayres (1990), ‘Playing Games with the Law’2. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Eric Rasmusen, Jeffrey Evans Stake, Robert H. Heidt and Michael Alexeev (1997), ‘Review Dialogue: On Game Theory and the Law’3. Eric A. Posner (2000), ‘Agency Models in Law and Economics’4. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), ‘Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View’PART IIBARGAINING AND PROCEDURE 5. Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1989), ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’6. I.P.L. P’ng (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial’7. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’8. Lucien Arye Bebchuk (1996), ‘A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue’9. Keith N. Hylton (1994), ‘An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain’10. Ian Ayres (1991), ‘Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations’PART IIICONTRACTS 11. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner (1992), ‘Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules’12. Eric B. Rasmusen (2001), ‘Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs’13. J. Mark Ramseyer (1991), ‘Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan’PART IVTORTS, CRIME, AND TAXES 14. John Prather Brown (1973), ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Liability’15. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’16. Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement’17. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), ‘The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’PART VCOURTS 18. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’19. Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), ‘A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the “State Farm” and “Grove City” Cases’20. Frank H. Easterbrook (1988), ‘Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions’Name Index