Weiying Zhang is a Professor of economics at Peking University. His research interests include Applied Game Theory, information economics, corporate governance, Chinese economic development and reform.

• List of figures. List of tables. Foreword to the Chinese Edition Chapter 1 Individual Rationality and Social Optimum Chapter 2 The Nash Equilibrium and the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game Chapter 3 Multiple Equilibriums, Institutions, and Cultures Chapter 4 Threats and Commitments Chapter 5 Bargaining and Patience Chapter 6 Repeated Games and Cooperative Behavior Chapter 7 Incomplete Information and Reputation Chapter 8 Adverse Selection, Brands, and Regulation Chapter 9 Signaling and Social Norms Chapter 10 Mechanism Design and Income Distribution Chapter 11 Moral Hazard and Corruption Chapter 12 Evolutionary Games and the Spontaneous Order Chapter 13 Laws and Social Norms Chapter 14 Institutional Entrepreneurs and the Rules of the Game References. Index

Weiying Zhang is a Professor of economics at Peking University. His research interests include Applied Game Theory, information economics, corporate governance, Chinese economic development and reform.

• List of figures. List of tables. Foreword to the Chinese Edition Chapter 1 Individual Rationality and Social Optimum Chapter 2 The Nash Equilibrium and the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game Chapter 3 Multiple Equilibriums, Institutions, and Cultures Chapter 4 Threats and Commitments Chapter 5 Bargaining and Patience Chapter 6 Repeated Games and Cooperative Behavior Chapter 7 Incomplete Information and Reputation Chapter 8 Adverse Selection, Brands, and Regulation Chapter 9 Signaling and Social Norms Chapter 10 Mechanism Design and Income Distribution Chapter 11 Moral Hazard and Corruption Chapter 12 Evolutionary Games and the Spontaneous Order Chapter 13 Laws and Social Norms Chapter 14 Institutional Entrepreneurs and the Rules of the Game References. Index

Weiying Zhang is a Professor of economics at Peking University. His research interests include Applied Game Theory, information economics, corporate governance, Chinese economic development and reform.

• List of figures. List of tables. Foreword to the Chinese Edition Chapter 1 Individual Rationality and Social Optimum Chapter 2 The Nash Equilibrium and the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game Chapter 3 Multiple Equilibriums, Institutions, and Cultures Chapter 4 Threats and Commitments Chapter 5 Bargaining and Patience Chapter 6 Repeated Games and Cooperative Behavior Chapter 7 Incomplete Information and Reputation Chapter 8 Adverse Selection, Brands, and Regulation Chapter 9 Signaling and Social Norms Chapter 10 Mechanism Design and Income Distribution Chapter 11 Moral Hazard and Corruption Chapter 12 Evolutionary Games and the Spontaneous Order Chapter 13 Laws and Social Norms Chapter 14 Institutional Entrepreneurs and the Rules of the Game References. Index