Game Theory and Public Policy, Second Edition

Roger A. McCain, Professor Emeritus, School of Economics, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, USA

• Contents: Preface PART I HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL SURVEY 1. Objectives and scope of the book 2. Representing games 3. A brief interpretive history of game theory 4. Nash equilibrium and public policy 5. Correlated equilibrium 6. Noncooperative games in extensive form and public policy 7. Social mechanism design 8. Superadditive games in coalition function form 9. Recall, rationality and political economy PART II MIXED COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE DECISIONS: EXTENSIONS 10. Biform games and considerable solutions 11. The firm as a coalition 12. What coalitions will be formed? 13. Monopoly and monopsony revisited 14. Bargaining and the determination of wages 15. Bargaining power and majority rule References Index

Acclaim for the first edition:'[T]he McCain book is a thoughtful and thought-provoking survey of the post-war game theoretic literature. It is notable for its clear exposition, its willingness to acknowledge weaknesses and ambiguities of game theory, and its many illustrations. It would make an excellent text for students who have already learned a bit of game theory in earlier classes and who are open to broader issues than those covered in more mathematical and more elementary books. It is also good bedtime reading for academics who use a bit of game theory in their own work and for theorists who are interested in methodological issues associated with rational choice models.' --Roger D. Congleton, Public Administration