From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World Without War

ROGER HILSMAN has been Professor of Government and International Politics at Columbia University since 1964. Before that he was President Kennedy's Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. He is author of more than a dozen books on world politics and military strategy, including The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy (Praeger, 1996).

• Preface The First Attempts at Nuclear Strategy The Manhattan Project and Early Strategic Thinking Nuclear Strategy and the Attack on Korea The New Look, Massive Retaliation, and Flexible Response The H-Bomb and the Balance of Terror The Debate on Nuclear Strategy The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Case Study of Nuclear Strategy The Crisis The Significance Post-Crisis Attempts at a Nuclear Strategy McNamara II, the Schlesinger Doctrine, and Star Wars No First Use, Counterforce,and MAD as a Strategy The Breakup of the Soviet Union and the Bush-Yeltsin Agreement The World Turned Upside Down Developments in Weapons The Members of the Nuclear Club and Their Arms Soviet, Chinese, and European Nuclear Strategy Armageddon: Six Scenarios of Nuclear War For Arms Control and Disarmament The History of Arms Control The Prospects Why War? The Social and Political Functions of War Nationalism A World Political Process without World Government? A Curious Creature Conclusions A Long-Term Solution, a Medium-Term Compromise, and a Short-Term Stopgap The Lessons of the "Small Wars" Since World War II Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Forces Conventional Forces for the Medium-Term Compromise Nuclear Forces for the Short-Term Stopgap Index