Paul Wragg is Professor of Law at the University of Leeds.

• PART 1RATIONALE1. Unity in Press Freedom Theory I. Introduction II. The Modern View III. The Teleological View in its Historical Context IV. Conclusion 2. Division in Press Regulatory Theory I. Introduction II. Press Regulation in Practice III. The Ideological Divide Over Press Regulation IV. The Press Reform Debate and its Discontents V. Conclusion PART 2RIGHT3. Duty I. Introduction II. Duty as a Legal Claim III. Duty as a Moral Justification IV. Conclusion 4. Responsibility I. Introduction II. Burdens for Benefits III. Responsibilities Curbing Misuse of Power IV. Professionalism and the Dualism of Responsibility V. Conclusion 5. Accountability I. Introduction II. Mill’s Argument from Truth III. Liberty, Rationality, and the Press IV. The Accountability Model Outlined V. Liberty and the Press VI. Conclusion PART 3REGULATION6. Society I. Introduction II. The Meaning of Accuracy III. The Harm of Inaccuracy IV. The Limits of Accuracy Regulation V. Conclusion 7. Victims I. Introduction II. Content III. Conduct IV. Public Interest Expression V. Conclusion 8. Readers I. Introduction II. Consumer Protection III. Autonomy and Automatons IV. Conclusion PART 4REALISATION9. How? I. Introduction II. Terminal Failings in the Contractual Model III. Statutory Regulation, Press Freedom, and Pareidolia IV. Sanctions V. Conclusion 10. Why? I. Introduction II. Why Regulate the Press? III. Why Regulate the Press? IV. Why Not?

The merits of this volume are numerous. The “liberation” of the press from its public interest obligations promotes purity of doctrine, which can focus individual legal systems even more on the freedom of debate in public affairs. At least as important is the parallel statement that the reader has a responsibility to be properly informed and cannot expect it from a press regulatory body, and that the democratic public sphere is thus made up of the efforts of many participants readers, advertisers, journalists, and publishers. The recognition of the multifaceted nature of the “freedom of the press” is also an important insight, as a result of which it may be worth rethinking some of the theoretical foundations of the freedom of the press. In addition, the volume argues convincingly that “coercive”—that is, statutory—regulation in the field of the press is not incompatible with protecting freedom of the press. The author thus successfully shakes up “dead dogmas”. Mill himself would be proud.