Franchise Contracting and Organization

Edited by Francine Lafontaine, Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy and Professor of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, US

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Francine LafontainePART IAGENCY THEORY AND FRANCHISING 1. Richard E. Caves and William F. Murphy II (1976), ‘Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets’2. Paul H. Rubin (1978), ‘The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract’3. G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter (1985), ‘The Economics of Franchise Contracts’4. James A. Brickley and Frederick H. Dark (1987), ‘The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising’5. Francine Lafontaine (1992), ‘Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results’6. Andrea Shepard (1993), ‘Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing’7. Sugato Bhattacharyya and Francine Lafontaine (1995), ‘Double-sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts’8. Nancy A. Lutz (1995), ‘Ownership Rights and Incentives in Franchising’9. Francine Lafontaine and Sugato Bhattacharyya (1995), ‘The Role of Risk in Franchising’10. Asher A. Blass and Dennis W. Carlton (2001), ‘The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws that Limit that Choice’11. Francine Lafontaine and Kathryn L. Shaw (2005), ‘Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising’PART IISELF-ENFORCEMENT AND FRANCHISING 12. Benjamin Klein (1980), ‘Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements’13. James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark and Michael S. Weisbach (1991), ‘The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws’14. Patrick J. Kaufmann and Francine Lafontaine (1994), ‘Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald’s Franchisees’15. Benjamin Klein (1995) ‘The Economics of Franchise Contracts’PART IIIMULTI-TASKING AND COMPLEMENTARITIES 16. Margaret E. Slade (1996), ‘Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration’17. Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade (1996), ‘Retail Contracting and Costly Monitoring: Theory and Evidence’18. Jeffrey L. Bradach (1997), ‘Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains’19. James A. Brickley (1999), ‘Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising’20. Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud (2002), ‘Residual Claims and Self-enforcement as Incentive Mechanisms in Franchise Contracts: Substitutes or Complements?’PART IVFRANCHISING AND OUTLET-LEVEL OUTCOMES 21. John P. Shelton (1967), ‘Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency”: Comment’22. John M. Barron and John R. Umbeck (1984), ‘The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets’23. Richard L. Smith II (1982), ‘Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution’24. Alan B. Krueger (1991), ‘Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry’25. Margaret E. Slade (1998), ‘Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?’26. Steven C. Michael (2000), ‘The Effect of Organizational Form on Quality: The Case of Franchising’Name Index

'An excellent collection of the best recent research examining franchise contracting and related organizational issues from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.'