Yane Svetiev is Associate Professor at University of Sydney Law School.

• Introduction I. Transformation of EU Competition Law: From Cross-border Transactions to Economic Efficiency? II. A New Equilibrium for EU Competition Law: Legalism or Regulation? III. The Status of Competition in the EU Internal Market: Competitive Markets and Public Interest Objectives IV. Competition Law and Experimentalist Governance V. The Scope Conditions for Experimentalist Governance in Competition Law 1. Networks and Hierarchy: Completing an Experimentalist Architecture? I. The ECN as a Convergence Network? II. Detecting Experimentalism in Light of Institutional Ambiguity III. Enforcement Institutions, Techniques and Procedures IV. Substantive Competition Law: Shadowing the Commission or Innovating? V. Experimentalism and Institutional Design VI. Conclusion 2. Experimentalism and the Choice of Enforcement Technique I. From Rule-Enforcement to Problem-Solving in Market Regulation II. The Transformation of EU Competition Enforcement: Legalism or Experimentalism? III. The Use of Commitments in EU Competition Enforcement IV. Commitment Decisions and Experimentalism V. Experimentalism and the Choice of Enforcement Technique VI. Conclusion 3. Peer Review in Experimentalist Market Regulation I. The Forms and Functions of Peer Review II. Formalising Peer Review in EU Market Regulation III. Transformation and Assemblage: Experimentalist Peer Review in Competition Law? IV. Conclusion 4. Courts and Experimentalist Competition Governance I. Judicial Review of Competition Decision-Making II. Dialogic Review: Judicial Review and Peer Accountability III. Private Antitrust Litigation and Experimentalist Governance IV. Conclusion 5. Experimentalist Governance and International Antitrust I. Globalising Competition Law and Policy II. An Informal Competition Network: A Stepping Stone to Experimentalism? III. The ICN in its Second Decade: A Focus on Implementation IV. Transnational Peer Review in Competition Law and Policy V. Experimentalism and Shared Enforcement Context VI. Conclusion ConclusionI. From Spontaneous Workarounds to Deliberate Experimentalism II. Experimentalist Governance: Prospects, Limits and Constraints